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4RAbstract
A  growxing number  of  countries  have  introduced  mandators  defined  contribution  schemes.  As  these
schemes  mature,  their  success  will increasingly  depend  on  how  well they  translate  accumulated  funds
into  a stream  of  retirement  income.  Successful  reforms  will relv on  a well  regulated  and  competitive
insurance  sector.  Thev  will  strike  a  balance  between  individual  preferences  and  public  policy
objectives  such  as  providing  a  reasonable  amount  of  longevity  insurance.  This  paper  describes  the
benefit  stage  in  four  Latin  Amenrcan  countries  and  presents  preliminarv  evidence  on  their  emerging
annuities  markets.  We  find  that  these  markets  are  less  transparent  than  they  should  be  and  that
supervision  is  less  strict  than  during  the  accumulation  period.  Annuities  markets  will  grow
dramatically  in the  coming  decades  as  the  reforms  mature.  Growth  depends  on  policy  variables  such
as  the  use  of  recognition  bonds  as well  as  initial  conditions.  The  markets  in Peru  and  Colombia  will
be  much  smaller  than  those  in  Chile  and  Argentina  in  both  absolute  and  relative  terms.  The
immaturitv  of  the  schemes  and  temporarily  limited  flow  of  new  pensioners  should  be  viewed  as  a
window  of  opportunity  for  improving  supervision,  increasing  transparency  and  educating  workers.
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3I.  Introduction
L I  The stampede  to defined  nontributions
Observers  used  the  term  "stampede"  to  describe  the  massive  shift  to  defined
contribution  pensions  in  the  United  States in the late  1980s.  By 1995, more  US worlkers
belonged  to DC  schemes than belonged  to the traditional DB schemes that dominated  most
of the post-war  period.  Similar patterns  have recently begun to unfold in Europe,  especially
in  the  UK.'  Even  Japan  will enter  the  world  of  defined  contribution  pensions  with  new
reforms introduced  in 1999.
Perhaps  most  strik-ing has  been  the recent  spread  of mandatorn  DC  schemes.  Chile
led  the  way  and  by  1994,  the  list  included  Australia,  Argentina,  Colombia,  Peru  and
Switzerland.  As  the  centurv  ended,  a wave of  so-called  "multipillar"  reforms  introduced
mandatory  DC  schemes  to  countries  as diverse as Mexico and  Sweden, Poland  and  Hong
Kong.  In 2000,  the number  of workers  contributing  to mandated  DC  schemes around  the
world will surpass 90 million.
Figure 1  Contributors  to mandatory  privately-managed
defined  contribution  schemes,  1982-2000
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Source: Palacios and Pallares  (1999).
l  Disney and Whitebouse (1992).
4The  global  trend  is clear,  but  the  full implications  for  public  policy  are  still ernerging.  2
For  example,  worker  education  and  the  availabilitv  of  good  information  are  crucial  for
privately-managed  DC  schemes  but  most  countries  do  not  have  clear  strategies.  Ir  the  UK,
the  debate  over  the  kind  of  information  and  the  government  agencv  that  should  provide  it
continues  a  decade  after  personal  pensions  were  introduced.;  In  addition,  important  issues
such  as  the  impact  of  regulations,  guarantees  and  administrative  charges  on  DC
accumulations  have  only recently  come  under  intense  scrutiny.  Clearlv,  the  experiences  that
are  unfolding  should  be  carefullv  tracked  and  studied.
In  the  short  run,  attention  will  be  focused  on  the  acczcmz/lazion  sfage of  the  new  DC
schemes.  This  makes  sense  since  most  of  the  participants  in the  new  plans  are  under  age 40.
The  unresolved  issues  related  to  the  benelit stage  wil  only  begin  to  have  a major  impact  in  10
or  20  years.  In  the  context  of  politicallv  and  technically  complex  reforms,  it  may  be
tempting  to postpone  decisions  on  how  accumulated  funds  will be  drawn  during  retirement. 4
Nevertheless,  there  are  good  reasons  not  to  wait.  First,  in  designing  of  the  reform
itself,  the  benefit  stage  must  fully  integrated  into  the  overall  structure  of  the  new  system.
For  example,  the  institutions  that  participate  in  the  accumulation  period  may  play  a  role  in
the  benefit  stage.  The  criteria  used  to  determine  the  tvpe of  institutions  participate  in  the
sector  therefore  should  take into  account  their  future  role  as benefit  provider.
Second,  many  reforms  offer  a  choice  to workers  between  an  old  public  DB  scheme
and  the  new,  private  DC  scheme.  The  information  workers  have  to  make  this  choice  must
be  as  clear  as  possible  and  should  be  based  upon  reasonable  assumptions  aboult  costs,
individual  choice  and  institutional  safeguards.  Basic  information  about  the  benefit  stage
should  be  included.
Finally,  the  early  period  of  system  immaturity  should  be  seen  as  a  window  of
opportunity  for  improving  the  regulatory  structure,  supervision  capacity  and  general
robustness  of  the  main  sector  involved  - insurance.  These  parallel  reforms  can  take  years  to
implement.
In  the  long  run,  the  new  pension  schemes  will be  considered  successful  if the  net  rate
of  return  to  contributions  are  somewhat  higher  than  the  growth  of  wages  during  the
accumulation  stage  and  if  the  income  stream  provided  after  retirement  is adequate,  secure
and  reasonably  priced.
2  For example in the US context  see, Mitchell and Schieber eds. (1998).
3  Whitehouse (1999).
4  Poland,  for example, has begun  to implement  its multipillar pension  reform  without  having made
many  of the basic decisions about  annuity provision.  See Chlon  et. al., (1999).
5LI2 The benefit  sta,ge  in a defined  contribution  settin,g
MIost public  pension  schemes  prormise an  annuity  and  most  use  a  defined  benefit
formula  based  on  past  earnings  and  contribution  vears.  The  relationship  between  actual
contributions  and  the benefit  calculated is often arbitrary and changes frequently over time.5
This return is largely a function  of public policy and political discretion. 6
In  contrast,  the  return  in  a  privately-managed,  DC  scheme  has  two  separate
components  - both  determined by market  forces.  During the accumulation stage, the return
is the  result  of investment  choices  and  transaction  costs.  Net  returns  xvill themselves  be
affected  by the  design of the  system.  For  example,  reporting  rules imnposed  by  regulators
will raise  costs  and  portfolio  limits may  reduce  risk-adjusted  returns.  At  retirement,  the
compounded  net  rate  of return  can  be  easily calculated by looking  back  at  the  history  of
contributions,  charges and returns.
During  the  benefit  stage of  a  DC  scheme,  returns  depend  crucially on  three  policy
choices.  The  first is whether  or not  to  impose  restrictions  on  withdrawals.  If none  are
imposed,  the  outcome  depends  only  on  individual  decisions  made  after  retirement.
However,  any  restrictions  that  are  imposed  are likely to  be  the  key  deterninants  of  the
ultimate income  stream obtained  during retirement.
Several  reasons  are  given  for  restricting  withdrawals  after  retirement.  The  most
obvious  is that  the same myopic  workers  that  were forced to  save for  retirement  may now
spend  their accumulations  recklessly  and wvind  up in poverty.  A more  cynical rationale  for
intervention  is to  prevent  workers  from  spending  their retirement  savings in  order to  gain
access to means-tested  programs.8 Protection  against longevity risk is a fundamental  policy
objective  in almost  all publicly-mandated  retirement  savings plans.  In  a DC  environment,
this protection  can be provided  through  the purchase of an annuity.
Another,  quite  different  kind  of  argument  for  government  intervention  is  annuity
market  failure.  This  concern  is elaborated  in a body  of literature that  has tried to  explain
why  a  voluntary  annuity  market  has  failed  to  develop  despite  the  welfare  enhancing
properties  of  longevity insurance. 9 One  of the  possible culprits  is adverse  selection.  This
could  occur  im an annuity market  when  potential  annuitants have  better  information  about
their  own  longevity than  those  selling the  annuities.  In order  to  compensate  for  the lower
than  average  mortality  of  annuitants,  sellers raise  prices  to  levels  that  discourage  most
consumers.  The annuity market that theory suggests would benefit many individuals, fails to
materialize.
; Schwarz and Demirguc-Kunt (1999).
6  The recent reforms that introduce "notional accounts" attempt to remove discretion in a pay-as-
you-go setting. The question is whether it is harder for a government to change a DB accrual rate
than a notional interest rate. See  Disney (2000).
7  See Srinivas,  Whitehouse and Yermo (1999).
8  Kotlik-off  (1987)  illustrates  this in a simple model.
9 As first demonstrated in Yaari (1965).
6Ev-idence  of what  ma-  be  adverse  selection  has  been  presented  in  a number  of  studies
that  compare  the  "fair  annuitv"  based  on  population  mortalitv  tables  with  actual  annuities
offered  in  the  market.  The  available  empirical  e-vidence  suggests  that  the  differencc  between
the  fair  (actuarial)  cost  of  an  annuitv  calculated  using  population  life  tables  and  the  observed
market  price  is between  7  and  15 percent."'  This  is often  attributed  to  adverse  selection.
Whether  adverse  selection  in  the  annuitv  markets  is to  blame  for  the  low  observed  demand
for annuities  is an important  question  and  is discussed  below  in Section  IA.
In  practice,  most  countries  do  impose  restrictions  on  the  manner  in  which  DC
accumulations  can be  drawn  down.  In  fact,  onlv  Australia  and  Hong  Kong  allow  lump  sum
withdrawals  upon  retirement.  In  other  countries  individuals  are  forced  to  draw  down  their
balances  graduallv  to  protect  against  earlv  depletion  (scheduled  xvithdrawals)  or  to  purchase
annuities.  The  restrictions  varv  in  termns of  allowable  products  and  minimum  levels  of
annuitization  but  the  range  of  options  is limited.  Also,  while  most  countries  opt  for  pnrvate
proVisionl1 ,  but  often  impose  special  requirements  on  firms  wishing  to  participare  in  this
market.  In  short,  for most  mandatorv  DC  schemes,  the  design  of  the  benefit  and  the  market
conditions  under  which  they  are produced  have  a major  impact  on  the  scheme's  participants.
This  paper  focuses  on  the  benefit  stage  in  four  Latin  American  countries  with
mandatorv  defined  contribution  schemes.  The  next  section  describes  the  rules  for
w-ithdrawal  upon  retirement  and  provides  some  preliminary  observations  as  to  the
differences.  Section  III  discusses  the  development  of the  annuities  markets  in  the  context  of
the  reforms.  In  the  fourth  section,  we  look  to  the  available  literature  to  assess  the  likelv
impact  of  benefit  design  on  the  annuitv  markets  in  the  future  as  well  as  on  the  w elfare  of
scheme  participants.  The  last  section  makes  some  preliminary  conclusions  about  lessons  for
benefit  design  in multipillar  schemes.
IC  See for example, Friedman  and WXvarshawskv  (1988, 1990) Finkelstein  and  Poterba  (1999). Mitchell
et al. (1998), Walliser (1997) and Piggott et al (1999),James  and  Vittas (1999).
1  The new Swvedish  second pillar will be annuitized  through  a public monopoly.
7II.  The benefit  stage  in four Latin American  countries
Eight  Latin American countries have privatized all or part of their main public pension
schemes in the last two decades.  Chile'2 was the  first and  therefore  has the most experience
with  members  retiring  and  withdrawing  benefits.  A  second  group,  including  Argentina
(1994)'3, Colombia  (1993)'4, Peru  (1993) have  a small, but  growsing number  of  pensioners
while  the  newest  reforms  in  Bolivia  (1997)15,  El  Salvador  (1997),  Mexico  (1997)16 and
Uruguay (1996) have practically no experience.  The benefit  stage in each of these schemes is
highly  regulated.  This  paper  focuses  on  the  four  reformed  svstems  with  the  longest
experience to date."
II. I  Regulated  benefit  options
In  all four  countries,  policymakers  have  opted  to  allow  scheduled  withdrawals  and
annuities.  In certain  cases, restrictions  apply as to which  of the  two can be selected by the
individual.' 8
Programmed  or scheduled  withdrawvals  (SW) do  not  provide  longevity insurance  since  the
balance  can fall to  zero  before the retired  person  dies.  It  also fails to provide  a floor with
regards to poverty.  It is however, intended  to prevent  the worker from  spending his balance
in the  first years of retirement  by setting a schedule  of payments  based  on life expectancy.
The SW also allows the individual to leave a bequest  since it remains his or her property.
In  each country,  this  form  of benefit  is handled  by  the  pension  fund administrator
(AFP).  The benefit is recalculated annually based on  the investment  return achieved and the
new age-specific mortality rates.  A key feature of this instrument  is that it allows the worker
to participate in investment  returns.  However, it also exposes the worker  to investment  risk
and results in a more volatile and unpredictable  stream of payrments.  The formula applied is
strictly regulated and uses a moving average interest  rate in the calculation that has the effect
of smoothing  the payment  stream.  Box 1 below describes  the  details of the  SW calculation
in Chile where returns  have been  quite high since inception.'9 This  formulation  could result
in a sharply declining benefit levels however,  if high early returns  give way to lower  returns
in the long run.
12  See Iglesias  and Acuna (1992)  and Diamond and Valdes (1993).
13  Rofman  (forthcoming).
14  Ayala (forthcoming).
5 von  Gersdorff  (1997).
16  Grandolini  and Cerda (1998).
17  The  four background  papers for this study were produced  by Rofman  and Grushka  (Argentina),
Avala (Colombia), Mastrangelo (Chile) and Rofman  (Peru).
18  In  Chile, the annuity must  be greater than the minirmum pension.
19  The Association  of AFPs  reports  that  average real returns  between  1981 and  1999 were  more
than  11 percent.
8Box 1 Chile's scheduled withdrawal option
Each programmed retirement annuity is calculated according to the following formula:
pI  =  F,
where.  F, is the individual account balance in year t.
q, is the probability that the individual will live to year x, given that he or she has lived
until year t.  Normally, qx=°, when x>l 10.
The discount rate used in the calculation is obtained as follows:
so
i,  = 0,  80x  tirvm- + 0, 20x  E  r,,  '-
1- 1
where,  ih  is the discount rate of AFP i in year t
tirvt is the average implicit rate applied to life annuities in year t.
ri is the average profitability of AFP i pension funds.
If the pension calculated  according to the programmed retirement formula falls below the
minimum pension for  the age  of the affiliate, he or  she may request that the AFP readjust the
pension up to the minimum.  When the account balance reaches zero, the worker may request the
minimum pension guaranteed by the government, as long as he or she has paid into the system for at
least 20 years and does not have income from other sources greater than the minimum pension.  If
these  requirements are  not met, the  account balance  runs  out and the affiliate is left without a
pension from the svstem.  From  the above, it can be inferred that  in the programmed retirement
plan, the employees take on the investment risk and the risk of living long enough to exhaust their
individual account balance.
Annui{y  options  are  offered  in  all  four  countries.  The  allowable products  vary with
regard  to  the  possibility  of  deferral,  amount  of  temporary  withdrawal,  survivor  benefits,
guarantees,  denomination,  indexation  rules and participation  in investment  returns.
All  of  the  countries  allow  an  immediate  life  annuity.  In  Chile  and  Peru,  retiring
workers may choose  to  defer their  annuity  for sometme  (usually one or two vears). During
this  period,  retirees  receive  a  temporary  benefit,  in  the  form  of  a  scheduled  Withdrawal,
which may amount  to as much  as twice the expected annuity.  This arrangement  has created
some  problems.  On  one  hand,  some  beneficianies  enter  the  contract  without  fullv
understanding  that their benefits  will be reduced  by as much  as 50% in a year or two or that
the  higher  benefit  in  the  first years  implies a  reduction  for  the  remaining  lifetime.  Also,
because  the  deferred  annuity  is  contracted  at  the  time  of  retrement  (and  the  capital  is
transferred  at that time) some problems  may arise when  returns  in the pension  fund are not
those  expected.  If returns  are  high, benefits  will be  increased  (increasing the  gap between
the temporary benefit  and  the annuity), but if returns  are lower than  expected, the individual
accounts mav run  out of monev before  the deferment  period is completed.
9In Chile, a life annuity plus guaranteed  period of payment  after death is also available
whereby,  upon  the  death  of  the  affiliate the  life insurance  company  continues  to  pav the
spouse  for  a  fixed  period.  One  version  of  this  product  has  come  to  be  known  as the
"thinking  of her"  life annuity.  It pays the same amount  until both  spouses die.  Finally, there
is a life annuity with  a guarantee  period of payments  to  survivors which pays until the total
pension  paid  is  equal  to  the  original  premium.  In  a  departure  from  the  Chilean model,
Argentina's  law limits the choice of annuities to one type, a joint-and-survivor  annuity.
In Peru,  the  law indicates  that two  types of annuities  can be  obtained  - a "Personal
Annuity"  or a "Familv Annuity".  The first option is open to single workers with no potential
survivors.  This type  of annuity  can be  offered  only by the AFPs.  This provision  has been
cnticized,  mostly  because  it makes it possible  for  the AFPs  to  assume insurance  type risks,
thereby  changing  their role as managers  of third  partv  funds.  In practice,  the  existence of
this  altemative  is only  notional  since  the  Supervisor  has  not  issued  the  necessary detailed
regulations, and the industry does not yet appear to be interested  in this market.
The  second  option  is the  Family Annuity.  In this  case, the beneficiary purchases  an
annuity  from  an  insurance  company  that  includes  the  potential  payments  to  survivors.
Family annuities can be offered with a number  of options.  First, they can be offered in Soles
(with  an  indexation  rule)  or  in  US  Dollars.  In  addition,  beneficiaries  can  purchase  a
combination  of  a  time-limited  scheduled  withdrawals  and  a  deferred  annuity,  where  the
benefit  to be obtained  from the  scheduled withdrawal can be anywhere between the annuity
twice that amount.  Finally, as in Chile, it is possible to ask for a "guaranteed" period.
Because  of the  combination  of different  options  (currency,  time of delay, amount  to
be  paid  during  the  temporary  withdrawal,  amount  and  period  guaranteed),  the  number  of
possible  products  is quite large.  As of March  1999, the Supervision  of Pension  Funds  had
approved  121 possible  products,  and  they  were  considering  requests  for  authorization  of
other  combinations  that would  take the total number  of alternatives to more  than  500.  Box
2 describes  the products  currently available.
Argentina  is  unique  in  this  group  in  that  it  allows  annuitants  to  participate  in
investment  returns. 20 The  Argentine  variable  annuity  promises  some negotiated  share  of
returns  above the minimum  4% nominal return.  There are no regulations on how and when
the excess return  should be transferred  to annuitants.  In practice, insurance companies have
taken  different  approaches.  In  some  cases,  reserves  have  been  increased,  resulting  in  a
higher  expected  flow  of benefits  in the  future.  In others,  a lump  sum payment  has been
made  at the  end  of the  year based  on  the  excess returns.  At  least one  company  offers  to
maintain  the  excess in a separate  reserve, to  be inherited  by survivors  once  the beneficiary
dies.  Also, method  of calculating excess returns  is not clear.  Finally, assets backing annuity
reserves  are  not  separated  from  other  assets  of  the  insurance  companies  and  valuation
regulations  are weak.
2(1' Bolivia allows  variable annuities of the type described  in Box 3 below.
10Box 2  Annuity products offered in Peru
Amount Guaranteed: Amount a survivor spouse would receive if retiree dies:
42% (as prescribed in the law)
70%
100%

















Soles  (indexed  by inflation  in Lima)
US  Dollars
The  combination  of  these  different  options  generates  up to 432  possibilities,  although
there  are only  121 currently  authorized.
Survivor  benefits  also  vary  across  countries.  Spouse  benefits  are  set  at different  levels
although  always  as  a  percentage  of  the  retiree's  benefit.  The  benefit  is  70%  in  Argentina,
60%./o  in Chile,  100%  in Colombia  and  35%  in  Peru.21  Howev,er,  annuitants  in Chile  and  Peru
can  agree  with  their  insurance  companv  to  increase  this  percentage  up  to  100%  eiher  for
some  time  after  retirement  or  without  time  limits.  Of  course,  these  changes  increase  the
premium  and  reduce  the  monthly  payout.
21 In  Chile and  Colombia  there are differences  if the surviving spouse is male  or female, with a strong
bias against men. In all cases, there are also benefits for voung children.
11Indexation  is automatic  in Chile, where  annuitv  contracts  are made  in "Unidades  de
Fomento"  or UF,  an accounting  unit that is adjusted with inflation.  In Peru and  Colombia
annuity  payments  are inflation-indexed  while in Argentina  there  is no  indexation  at  all ie.,
contracts  are set in nominal  terms  (although implicit indexation  rules operates,  as discussed
below).'  Also,  annuity  contracts  can be  negotiated  in local currencv and  in  US dollars  in
Argentina  and Peru.
I.2  Price  restrictions
The  cost of the annuity should be a function of the expected survival of the annuitant,
the  administrative  charges  and  the  expected  rate  of  return  in  investment  the  insurance
company  may  obtain.  Each  of the schemes  regulates both  the  actuarial  table and  interest
rates  to  be  used  in  calculating  annuities.  These  regulations  are  the  main  source  of
government  influence  on pricing policy.
Life  tables,  or age-specific survival  expectations,  used  to  calculate  annuity  costs  are
specified  by  the  government. 2 3 None  of  the  four  countries  use  the  standard  national
mortality  data, which  reflect the  survival probability  of the  general  population  during  the
period  considered.  Instead,  in all cases special tables are applied and these  always use lower
mortality  rates.  In Argentina,  retirement  insurance companies  are required  to  use  the table
known  as "Group  Annuity  Mortality - GANI71", an actuarial table  developed  originally by
the Society  of Actuaries  of the United  States, which  is based,  with  several corrections  and
adjustments,  on  empirical data of annuitants'  mortality in the US during  the 1940s.  In Chile
and Peru,  the table in use is known as "Renta Vitalicia - RV85". This is a life table built with
Chilean data in the 1970s.  Finally, Colombia  has adopted  a table known  as ISS90, prepared
by the Institute  of Social Security in Colombia using experience from the ISS public pension
scheme participants.
All of these  tables  have mortalitv  rates  that  are significantly lower  than  the -national
level, as can be seen in Table  1.  The table also shows that if comparisons  are made  with  a
projected  life  table,  the  difference  drops  significantly  in  some  cases  (less  than  3%  in
Argentina)  but remains  high in others  (13.5% in Peru).  We return to the implications  of this
differential in Section  IV.
2  Indexation of any type has been restricted in the last few years as the country has moved to a
currency board.
23  None of the countries apply unisex  mortality tables. This practice is more common in Europe
and is mandatorv in the benefit stages  of the Hungarian and Polish multipillar  schemes.
12Table  1. Life expectancy  of Males  at age  65, according  to life tables in use  for annuity
calculation,  life tables  for 1995-2000 and projected  cohort life tables
Argentina  Chile  Colombia  Peru
Life  Table in Use  GAM71  RV85  ISS90  RV85
Life  expectancy  of males  at 65  15,11  16,65  15,94  16,65
(e(65))
-Absolute Difference of e(65)  1,13  1,86  1,24  3,09
with national  table 1995-2000
- Percent Difference of e(65) with  7,5%  11 2%  7,8%  18,6%
national  table 1995-2000
- Absolute  difference  of e(65)  0,42  1,38  1,02  2,25
with projected  table
- Percent  difference  of e(65)  with  2,8%  8,3%  6,4%  13,5c/o
,projected  table  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Source:  Own calculations  based on actual tables
The interest rates used in the calculation are also regulated.  In this area, an interesting
controversy  has emerged.  Traditionally,  insurance  supervision  has been  concemed  with the
safetv of the insurance company.  The main objective was to prevent  bankruptcy  and default.
Thus,  the  regulator  usually  sought  to  set  a  maximum  interest  rate  that  could  be used  in
annuity  calculations,  so  as  to  guarantee  that  there  unrealistic  promises  were  not  made.
Another  approach was to differentiate  between the interest rate required  for reserves and the
interest  rate used for annuity  quotation.  Here  super-visors require that  insurance  companies
have  enough reserves to pay a basic flow of benefits.  Insurance  companies  are free to offer
higher benefits, but that implies that  either they manage to obtain  higher rates in the market
or they must continuously  add funds  to the reserves.  Of course, this approach  only works if
supervision is very strict, in particular with regard to asset valuation.
In Argentina,  insurance  companies  are  required  to  use  a  4%  nominal  rate  for both
reserves  and quotation.  In Chile, until 1988 reserves were required  to be discounted  at a real
rate  of 3%.  Beginning in  that year, reserves  are discounted  whenever  possible at  the long
term rate of the underlying  assets.  Quotation  rates  were not  constrained,  and were usually
higher than what was applied for calculating reserves.  The situation in Peru and Colombia is
similar, with fixed interest rates  for reserves  (at 4% in Colombia  and  3% in Peru), while the
rate  for  quotations  is  free, recently  averaging  around  4%  in  Colombia  and  almost  6%  in
Peru.  Anecdotal  evidence suggests that  these differences  are not based  on actual differences
in returns  on long term assets  (e.g., bonds)  across  the countries, but  rather  to differences  in
annuity market conditions  and the lobbying power of the insurance industrv.
The  restrictions  on  how  the  annuity  is  calculated  is  the  main  influence  of  the
authorities  on  the  pnrce of the  product  in  the  market.  Otherwise,  costs  are not  capped  or
otherw7ise restricted.  However,  as  discussed  below,  the  supervisors  do  attempt  to  make
annuity providers  provide clear information  to help consumers  assess the market.
1311.3 Additional restrictions  and  options
In  addition  to  the  options  described  in  Section  I1.1, there  are  a  number  of  special
restrictions  and options worth  noting.
In  Chile, workers  that  retire with  balances  that  would  generate  annuities  below  the
minimum  pension  level are not given  the option  of purchasing  an  annuity. 2 4 Instead  they
must  contract  for a  scheduled  w-ithdrawal with  an AFP which,  upon  request,  would  make
pavments  equilalent  to  the  minimum  pension  until  the  balance  was  exhausted.  At  that
point,  the  individual  would  request  that  the  government  provide  a  minimum  pension.
Eligibilitv  for  the  minimum  pension  however,  is  to  have  made  at  least  twenty  years  of
contributions.
In  contrast,  Colombia  requires  workers  that  have  chosen  scheduled  withdrawals  to
purchase  annuities  once  the  assets in  the  account  fall to  the  level required  to  purchase  a
minimum  pension.  AFPs are responsible for making these arrangements.  Meanwhile, those
with SWs with larger balances may shift to the annuity option at any time.
Argentine,  Peruvian and Chilean workers have the option  of taking a lump  sum if the
remainder  of  the  balance  would  allow  them  to  purchase  an  annuity  that  provides  a
replacement  rate  of  70 percent.  In  Chile, this  is deterrnmined  according  to  the  following
formula  where  P is the pension,  W is the  monthly  wage,  PCI is the  consumer  price index
and MP is the minimum  pension.  In other  words, if the individual can purchase  an annuity
of value  equal  to  or greater  than  the  higher  of  1.2 times  the  rninimum  pension  or  a  70
percent  replacement  rate of the previous  five years' average real earnings,  any amounts  above
this  can be taken in the form  of a lump  sum.  Given  that  the ceiling on  taxable earnings in
Chile is twice the average wage, this means that  this constraint is binding  only up to annuity
values of 140 percent of the average wage.
20  PCIT
Y,WT- iX
P > Max  0, 7 x  120  T;  1,2X  MPT
120~  .1x
Table 2 below summarizes some of the main  features  of the regulated  benefit  options
in the four countries under  consideration.
24  This has the effect of postponing the outlay  from the governmnent  for the minimum pension undl
the balance  is exhausted.
14Table  2 Annuity  schemes  in selected  couintries. Key rtiles
'Topic  Argentina  Chile  Colombia  Ileru
.i'feTable used  GAM71  RV85  ISS9(  RV85
'1'echniical  interest  Fixed at 4%, nominal  Linked to underlying  Fixed at 4% real  Fixed at 3')o real
rate for reserves  assets returns.
'I'echnical iiterest tate  Fixed  at 4%/o,  nominal  m5.5/  real  Free, at around  4%  Free,  at around  5.7% real
for quotations  F  real
None  explicit.
Nne  expi  cit.  Anniuitics are defined in  Indexed witlh Lima's Antescan be in
Indexation  AUSiolasa  "UF", the basic inflation  Indcxed witlh Cl'I  CPI. Th'ley  can also be US dollars and
defined  as variable  indexed unit in Chile  in US dollars definied as variable
Spouse w/o  children  Widow w/o  children gets  Widow gets 35% of
Spouse  w/o  ch600/0  of  bee  .t  widowes35/oo
gets 70% of benefit,  b0/  of beneft,  widow  benefit. Widower or
reduced  o  f  with chilldren 50(%  plus  Spouse or childrend
Survivors' benefits  redued  at  50% orl  15% for each child under  under  18, a total of  children  iunde  18.g spueand 20%/ to each  1.Nbeeisfr0%ofbnit  an additional  14%.
chd  under  18, up to  18. No beefits  for  100  of beefit  Guaranteed  periods
100%  widower, unless disabled.  apl
G/uaranteed periods applyIII.  The emerging  annuity markets
III. 1 Current  market environment
Until recently, the insurance  sectors in most  of Latin America were characterized  by a
high  degree  of  state participation,  archaic  regulations,  restrictions  on  foreign  participation
and weak supervision.  Reforms  have  improved  the situation 25 but problems  remain.  Figure
2 below  shows  that  the  life  insurance  sector  is relativelv  small in most  of Latin  America
including three  of the  four countries  considered  here.  The kev exception  is Chile.  Largely
through  the  maturation  of  the annuities  business  Chile is rapidly achieving the penetration
levels of much  richer  countries  in Europe  and  North  America.  With  a growth  rate  of 17
percent  in US dollar terms, the  Chilean life insurance  sector has doubled this ratio in the last
decade.  We discuss the potential  impact  of this growth on  the capital markets below.
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Sources: Swiss  Re (1997);  Ayala (1999);  Mastrangelo  (1999);  Romano (1998).
25  For example,  in Colombia there are no longer government prescribed investments and foreign
investors can own 100  percent of insurance companies.
16The  shift  to  mandatorv  DC  schemes  led  to  a  discussion  regarding  the  institutional
arrangements  for  handling  the  annuitization  process.  While  there  was  some  debate  as  to
whether  the  annuitv  market  should  be  administered  bv  a  central  monopoly  or  a competitve
market  with  many- providers,  the  decision  for  a  decentralized  system  was  rapidly  accepted.
The  philosophy  behind  this  design  paralleled  the  accumulation  phase;  competilion  and
individual  control  would  produce  the  best  value  for the  members'  monev.
As  a result,  much  of  the  growth  in the  insurance  sector  in Chile  came  from  the  annuity
market.  Annuities  were  practically  non-existent  before  the  pension  reforms  created  demand.
For  example,  in  Chile,  annuities  represented  less  than  7%  of  the  insurance  market  as  late  as
1988,  seven  years after  the  reform.  In Argentina,  annuities  represented  less  than  0.2 '.o of  the
market  in  1989,  five vears  before  the  reform,  and  in  Peru,  at  the  time  of  the  reform  in  1994,
the  market  was  limited  to  tax  favored  deferred  annuitv  products  (Seguros  de  Retiro).
Todav,  the  annui-tv market  represents  about  one  third  of  the  insurance  business  in Chile  and
14 and  11  percent  of  the  market  in Peru  and  Argentina,  respectively  at  the  end  of  1998.  In
Colombia  the  market  is  still  small  and  represents  less  then  three  percent  of  the  ilsurance
sector  but  is growing  rapidly.  Except  in  Chile,  most  of  the  business  is  due  to  the  annuities
for  beneficiaries  of  survivors  and  disabilitv  benefits.
Life  insurance  companies  can  participate  in  annuities  markets  in Colombia,  C.hile and
Peru,  but  Argentina  requires  specialized  providers  that  have  separate  balance  sheets.  As  of
June  30,  1998,  twenty-one  retirement  insurance  companies  were  selling  pension  annuities  in
Argentina  (see Table  3 below).  While  this  number  of  companies  might  suggest  the  existence
of  a  competitive  market,  there  is significant  concentration  with  almost  70%  of  beneficiaries
in five companies.  Meanwhile,  seven  companies  have  1  %  or  less of the  market.
Almost  every  AFJP  is  strongly  linked  to  a  Retirement  Insurance  Company.  This
relationship  explains  the market  concentration:  nearly  86%  of beneficiaries  decided  to buv  an
annuity  from  the  insurance  company  linked  to  their  previous  AFJP.  This  low  mobility  can
be  explained  by  the  particular  marketing  conditions:  while  the  regulations  require  that  the
AFJP  must  inform  its  members  about  the  existence  of  different  annuity  providers  at time  of
retirement,  there  is  no  regulation  ensuring  equal  access  to  the  retiring  worker  to  all
companies.  The AFJPs  immediately  corumunicate  the  existence  of  a new  beneficiary  to their
related  RIC.
The  regulations  force  all companies  to  offer  an  identical  benefit  at the  beginning  of  the
retirement  period,  providing  less  incentive  to  study  the  market.  The  main  difference
between  companies  resides  in  the  way  that  part  of  the  returns  in  excess  of  the  guaranteed
4%  are  transferred  to  annuitants.  While  some  offer  to  make  an  annual  lump  sum  payment,
others  increase  the  reserves  and  thus  the  subsequent  monthly  pavments.
Eighteen  out  of  21 RICs  showed  losses  during  1997/98.  Total  annual  losses  amount
to  $20 million,  equivalent  to  24%  of  net  worth.  In  term  of  annual  premiums,  losses  reached
13%,  once  administrative  costs  (30%)  and  selling  charges  (6%/6)  were  considered.
17Table  3  Structure  of RICs  in Argentina
(premium as of 1997-1998,  assets  as of 6/30/1998)
C  Premium  Income  Assets  Domestic!
Company/Branch  o000 USD  %  of  GDP  000  USD  Foreign  Ownership?
Binaria  320  12003  DOMESTIC
Buenos  Aires- NYL  21552  129527  FOREIGN
Consolidar  1519  107011  33-67%
Estrella  21844  458516  FOREIGN
Fraterna  199  11184  DOMESTIC
Genesis  1632  59997  50-50%
Holando  Sudamericana  117  2041  FOREIGN
Instituto  Provincial  Entre  Rios  547  7170  DOMESTIC
Internacional  16053  141639  FOREIGN
ITT Hartford  813  27974  FOREIGN
Manana  310  5955  DOMESTIC
Nacion  867  36552  DOMESTIC
Profuturo  4734  32308  DOMESTIC
Providencia  675  17379  FOREIGN
Proyeccion  605  13578  DOMESTIC
San  Cristobal  753  8928  DOMESTIC
Sancor  3781  10506  DOMESTIC
Siembra  77630  _  486663  FOREIGN
Other  -35  _  11183
% of  premium Total RICs  operating  in Pension  153916  0.05  1580114 income  in foreign
System  companies:  91%
Other  RIC  2287  0.00
TOTAL  RIC  156203  0.05
Life Insurance  operating  in  246031  0.07
Pension  System
Other  Life  470212  0.14
TOTAL  LIFE  716243  0.22
RIC+LIFE  Insurance  companies  872446  0.26
Source: Argentine Insurance Supervision
In  Peru,  any  insurance  company  can  offer  annuities  to  retiring  workers  if  the
Supervision  of Pension  Funds  approves  it.  As of December  1998, there  were  16 insurance
companies  operating in Peru.  Of those,  five were active in the pensioners'  market  as shown
below  in  Table  4.  Four  of  these  companies  were  part  of an  economic  group  that  also
included  an AFP,  making  possible vertical  integration.  As in Argentina,  the link between
insurance  companies  and  AFPs  is  strong.  No  official  data  has  been  published  on  the
proportion  of retirees  that  choose  to buy an annuity  from an insurance  company  linked to
their AFP, but industry participants  estimate it at 80% or higher.  This is usually explained as
the  result  of  people  preferring  to  remain  with  the  same  economic  group  for  reasons  of
confidence.  Nevertheless,  it is clear that AFP employees in charge of administering benefits
have a strong influence  on the choice of annuity provider.
18Table  4  Beneficiaries  by AFP in Peru, end-December  1998
Retired  Survivors  Disabled
AFP  No  Part.  AFP  No  Part.  AFP  No  Part.  AFP
Horizonte  246  14.9°io  2,514  24.4%  113  19.9%
Integra  516  31.20%  3,034  29.5%  127  31.2%
Nueva  Vida  199  12.0°o  626  6.1%sI  45  7.9%
Profuturo  371  22.4°o  2,471  24.0%  116  20.4%
Urion  324  19.6%  1,649  16.0%"o  117  20.6%
Total SSP  1,656  1  10,294  1  568  1
In  Colombia,  participation  is  concentrated  in  the  largest  life  insurance  companies  and
their  specialized  branches  that  belong  to  financial  conglomerates  that  also  run  AFPs  (see
Table  5).  Suramericana  and  Suratep  are  part  of  a  financial  and  industrial  group  closely
interrelated  though  ownership  of  shares  and  based  in  Medellin.  Alfa  and  Porvenir  belong  to
the  largest  national  financial  group  Sarriento  Angulo.  Colseguros  and  Colfondos  are  now
separated  but  were  initially  part  of  the  Santo  Domingo  consortium,  the  largest  farnily  owned
group.  Colmena  belongs  to Fundaci6n  Social, a Jesuit  group,  and  it has  participation  of AIG
in insurance  which  operates  an AFP.  Ganadera  belongs  to  the  same  financial  group,  Banco
de  Bilbao  (BBV),  which  owns  Honizonte,  the  fourth  largest  AFP.  Colpatria  is a medium  size
local  financial  group.  There  is larger  foreign  participation  in pension  fund  management  than
in  insurance  activities  - Citibank  in  Colfondos,  BBV  in  Horizonte,  and  smaller  Chilean
participations,  as  in  the  case  of  Porvenir  (Provida).  The  largest  supplier  is  Suramenrcana,
which  has  40%  of  the  mathematical  reserves  and  provides  35%  of  the  annuities.  Alfa,  the
second  largest,  has  17%  of  the  annuities  and  16%  of  the  reserves.  There  are  9  issuers  of
annuities,  but  5 of them  are verv  small.











Source:  Ayala (1999).
19In  Chile,  the  number  of  companies  selling  life  annuities  increased  from  18  to  28
between  1991 and  1998, resulting in a slow  but  steady  drop  in the  concentration  of  sales
measured both  bv number  of policies and  amount  of premiums.  Table  6 below  shows the
firms  by  name  and  share  of  the  market.  Important  American  and  European  insurance
groups are active in the market, including Aetna, AIG,  ING  and Allianz.
As a result of the  expansion  of  the Chilean  market,  the prernium  income  of the  life
insurance industry grew dramatically in the 1990s.  The growth rate of annuity premiums  was
more than 20 percent during the decade.  This dramatic  increase from about  420 mnillion  US$
to 1.7 billion USS in only 10 years is shown  below in Table 7.





Number of  Premium  Total Premium  Number  of
Policy  In UF  In UF  Total Premium  Policy
Consorcio  Nacional  de
Seguros  1,734  2,295.83  3,980,969  11.27%/o  8.20%
SantanderVida  2.184  1,386.71  3,028,575  8.58%  10.33%
La Construccion  1.762  1,601.83  2,822.424  7.99%  8.33%
Banrenta  1,920  1,304.23  2,504.122  7.09%  9.08%
ChilenaConsolidada  1.,625  1,510.76  2,454,985  6.95%  7.68%
Mass  717  3,381.98  2,424.880  6.87%  3.39%
Vida Corp  849  2,274.49  1,931,042  5.47%  4.01%
Euroamrnica  960  1,731.38  1,662,125  4.71%  4.54%
Interrentas  803  2,069.14  1,661,519  4.71%  3.80%
Aetna Chile  1,103  1,32253  1,458,751  - 4.13%  5.21%
Allianz Bice  1,031  1,388.30  1,431,337  4.05%  4.87%
BH1F America  920  1,321.62  1,215,890  3.44%  4.35%
ElRoble  722  1,521.47  1,098,501  3.11%  3.41%
ISE-AXA  740  1,471.07  1,088,592  3.08%  3.50%
Cruzdel  Sur  679  1,490.12  1,011,791  2.87%  3.21%
ING  478  1,88274  899,950  2.55%  2.26%
Principal  301  2.35&25  709,833  2.01%  1.42%
Renta Nacional  606  1,171.34  709.832  2.01%  2.87%
Convida  515  1,325.13  682,442  1.93%  2.43%
Cigna  237  2,305.07  546,302  1.55%  1.12%
CNA  478  1,14289  546,301  1.55%  2.26%
Vitalis  251  1,466.94  368.202  1.04%  1.19%
Corp  1  148  2.45236  362.949  1.03%  0.70%
CGS  197  1,818.61  358.266  1.01%  0.93%
CruzBlanca  123  1,678.05  206.400  0.58%  0.58%
Le Mans  53  2,168.17  114,913  0.33%  0.25%
La Previsi6n  15  1,921.45  28.822  0.08%  0.07%
TOTAL  21,151  1,669.41  35,309,716  100.00%Do  100.00D/o
Source:  Mastrangelo  (1999).
20Table  7  Premium  income  for life insurance  companies  in Chile,  1988-1997
millions  of 1998 USS
Year  Old age  Survivors/  Others  Total
disabilitv
1988  97.86  28.13  294.53  420.52
1989  155.89  90.07  261.86  507.83
1990  279.38  126.68  261.54  667.61
1991  503.67  65.06  256.25  824.97
1992  593.86  36.96  280.47  911.30
1993  657.38  57.32  314.10  1,028.80
1994  767.01  57.73  333.37  1,158.11
1995  857.27  66.16  372.38  1,295.81
1996  930.54  144.48  441.83  1,536.85
1997  1,034.59  144.92  530.82  1,710.33
Source: Chilean Association of Insurers.
The  short  to  medium  term  impact  on  the  private  insurance  sector  and  annuity
providers  in  particular  is a function  of several factors.  The  most  obvious  one  is coverage;
both  in  terms  of  the  labor  force  and  the  average  contributions.  Coverage  will  also
determinne  the magnitude  of the eventual flow into annuitv  markets as the scheme matured.
Not  all workers  in the  labor  force participate  in  the  new pension  system.  There  are
two possible reasons  for  this.  One  reason  is that  some workers  are not legally required  to
participate.  Tris  is the  case of self-employed  workers  in Chile and  Peru, who  can join the
system  on  a  voluntarv  basis,  or  many  special  groups  (the  militarv,  in  most  countries;
employees  of provincial  governments  in Argentina;  et  cetera)  who  are included  in separate
pension  programs.  Also, not  all workers  who  are legally required  to participate  are regular
contributors  to  the  systems.  The  informal  labor  market  is  large  in  Latin  America  is
extensive.  In  Argentina,  less  than  50%  of  required  contributions  are  actually paid  each
month.  The  estimates  of evasion  are much  higher im Peru  and Colombia  but  substantially
lower in Chile.
21Coverage in the first decade is also limited by the fact that  most transitions  are gradual
and  voluntary  to  some extent  and  involve  mostly  younger  workers. 26 Until these  workers
retire,  those  that  opted  to  stay in the public  PAYG  scheme will receive their benefits  from
the  government.  Figure  3 below  shows  the  age distribution  of affiliates in  mid-1999  for
Colombia.  The  other  countries  have  a similar age profile  of contributors  during  the  first
years of the reform.  In Colombia,  where  the option to switch back to the PAYG  scheme at
any time adds an element of uncertainty  to the potential market size. 2 7
In addition,  some members  of the priv7ate  scheme will not opt  for an old age annuity
when  thev  retire,  favoring  instead  a  scheduled  withdrawal.  As  mentioned  earlier,  some
Chilean  workers  - those  with  balances  below  what  is  required  to  generate  at  least  110
percent of the minimum  annuity  - do  not  even have this option.  Others may prefer to leave
bequests  or may have  so much  other  wealth  (although it is unlikely to  be  annuitized)  that
they prefer the combination  of higher risk and higher return.  Finally, they may expect to die
very soon in which case an annuity would  not make sense.  The deterninants  of demand  for
annuities are important  for policy formulation  and are discussed below in Section IV.
Figure 3  Age  distribution  of affiliates in
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Source: Colombian  Banking Supervision  website.
Table  8 shows  that the  annuity market  in Colombia and  Peru is still small and  highly
concentrated.  The Chilean market  in contrast,  has achieved critical mass and  with 28 firms
competing,  is less concentrated.  Life insurance  premrum income  in Chile have been  driven
up by the expansion  of the annuities market.
26  See Palacios  and Whitehouse (1999).
27  There is however,  a recent proposal submitted to the legislature  that would eliminate this option
in the future.
22Table  8  Annuity  market indicators,  latest year available
Argentina  Colombia  Chile  Peru
Number  of providers  21  9  28  5
Top 5 market share  91%  84%  44%  100%
Total premium $  156  134  1100  ?
(millions)
Total premium/GDP  0.1%  0.2%  1.5%  ?
Annuitants  8200  1888  25151  600+
III.2  MIarketing  annuities
Retiring  workers  in Peru  must  choose  up  to  eight altemative  annuitv  types and  the
AFP  must  request  quotations  from  every annuity  provider in the market.  Quotations  must
be  presented  in  a  standard  form  in  a  close  envelope,  which  can  only  be  opened  by  the
retiring worker.  Then the AFP must  prepare  a simple form where it states, for  each annuity
type, the  company  name, number  of reference  in the quotation,  interest  rate implicit in the
calculation  and  the  amount  the  beneficiary  will  receive  in  the  first  pa-yment. net  of
commissions.  This  system  appears  to  be reasonable,  but the  existence  of  many  types of
annuities  can  be  confusing  for  consumers.  AFP  personnel,  in  charge  of informning and
helping  them  to  make  an  adequate  choice  are  not  always well  trained.  While  insurance
company  agents  should  be  more  prepared  to  perform  this  task,  the  regulations  explicitly
prohibit  them  from approaching  retiring workers,  in an attempt  to protect  them  from  sales
pitches and limit the role of sales forces in the annuity selection process.
In  practice,  most  insurance  companies  have  organized small  sales forces  that  try to
contact  retiring workers.  Information  on  potential  clients is generally obtained  from  AFP
personnel,  with  or without  the knowledge  of their managers.  In many cases, workers  have
made  a  decision  on  what  product  and  provider  thev  will choose  before  requesting  the
quotations.  Consequently,  this  process  becomes  a  formalitv.  Regulation  regarding  sales
forces  is  not  completely  clear.  On  one  hand,  insurance  companies  cannot  contact
prospective  clients, because  they  are  not  supposed  to  know who  thev  are.  On  the  other
hand,  there  are no  restrictions  on  the insurance  company  that prevent  representatives  from
assisting  retiring  workers  that  contact  them  for  information.  Strangelv, according  to  the
current  rules, annuity providers  may have a sales force but may not actively solicit customers.
23So far,  there  is no  evidence of the development  of an "annuity consultants"  market.
Beneficiaries rely on the information  received from AFP and insurance company  employees,
but they do not  request independent  advice nor  are insurance  companies willing to promote
such activity.  Nevertheless,  the increasing  complexity of the annuity market, with more  and
more  options  from which  to choose, may be creating the conditions  that will lead to demand
for this service.
A  noteworthy  feature  of Peru's  retirement  system is that  regardless  of the  payment
method  selected  by  the  beneficiary,  actual payments  are made  by the  last AFP  where  he
made contributions  before retiring.  In the case Qf annuities, the AFPs act as payment offices
for  the  insurance  companies,  which  transfer  the  funds  to them  every month.  Similarly, all
administrative  paperwork  and  claims  are  conducted  through  the  AFP.  This  rule  was
established  to  simplify  the  paperwork  for  beneficaries,  and  to  reduce  costs,  since  the
insurance  companies  "use"  the AFP branches to  service their customers.  A consequence  of
this approach  is that many beneficiaries are not fully aware that their provider is an insurance
company, independent  from the AFP.  This reduces market transparencv.
In Chile, when  an affiliate reaches  legal retirement  age, the AFP to which  he belongs
informs  him as to the different  benefit  options available and the main features of each.  The
future  pensioner  then  requests  a  balance  certificate  from  the  AFP,  with  which  he  may
consult  an insurance  broker  or company  to obtain  pension quotes if he wants to draw  a life
annuity.  Alternatively  he  can consult  at  his AFP,  or any other,  regarding  the benefit  that
would be drawn the first year if he or she opted for a scheduled w-ithdrawal.
The AFPs  do not  encourage  affiliates to  select scheduled withdrawals, and  since they
all use the  same algorithm  calculations, one has only to compare  commissions  to see which
administrator  offers the best pension  alternative.  This is reflected in the fact that only 15%
of new pensioners  opt for the programmed  retirement  plan, while the remaining  85% select
an immediate  or deferred life annuity.
In marketing  life annuities,  both  insurance  brokers  and  companies  have  sales forces
that  seek out affiliates using a list of those  due to  take retirement  in the  comning  3-  months.
This  list  is  made  available  to  brokers  and  agents  by  the  Securities  and  Insurance
Superintendency.  In  addition,  there  is  an  unofficial  information  market  selling lists  of
affiliates who  have begun  early retirement  procedures  with their AFPs.  There  are also lists
of individuals who  have been  paid their Recognition  Bonds.  These lists are more useful  for
identifying potential  survivor's life annuity clients, since the names of retirement  pensioners
were  already available to  agents and  brokers  three  months  previously through  the  official
Insurance  Superintendency  listing.
Unfortunately,  future  pensioners  are almost  completely  unfamiliar  with  the  benefit
options  and the implicit logic of each.  And, even at retirement  age, a significant number  of
affiliates show  a strong  preference  for liquidity that  leads them  to  attempt  to  find ways to
escape the  benefit  rules.  For  example,  the  cormmissions charged by the insurance  brokers
are stamped  on the policy signed by the affiliate, so that it may be assumed  that the affiliate
is  familiar  with  these  fees.  The  commission  is  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  the  single
premium,  and ranges from 5 to 6% of the balance, although they occasionally run  as high as
2410%.  This  amount,  which  on  average  is  the  equivalent  of  2,500  to  3,000  US  dolars,
amounts  to  reducing  the  future  pension  bv the  percentage  commission.
It  can  be  assumed  that  these  high  comrmssions  are  being  shared  bv  the  broker  with
the  affiliate,  so that  those  who  cannot  withdraw  a free access  portion  still receive  a lump  sum
at the  time  of  retirement.  This  mechanism  is likely  to  represent  a  present  value  loss  to  the
pensioner,  since  it is  difficult  for  them  to  know  what  their  pension  would  have  been  under
normal  conditions.  In  addition,  the  broker  pays  income  tax  on  the  comrmissions  received,  so
that  a part  of  the  amount  paid  winds  up  in  government  coffers.  The  case  has  been  cited  of
an  individual  who  paid  a  life  insurance  company  a  single  premium  of  150,00()  dollars,
receiving  in  return  a  cash  payment  of  60,000  dollars  and  a  life  annuity  pension  of
approximately  130  dollars.  The  90,000  dollars  he  did  not  receive  would  have  been  enough
to purchase  a monthlv  pension  of  600  dollars.  This  case  resulted  in  Securities  and  Insurance
Superintendency  intervention,  and  life  insurance  companies  are  now  expressly  prohibited
from  making  direct  or  indirect  payments  to pensioners. 28
Insurance  brokers  face  a serious  conflict  of  interest.  In  effect,  the  main  role  played  bv
the  broker  is that  of  independent  consultant  to  future  pensioners.  However,  since  they  do
not  charge  their  clients  for  these  services  and  their  income  is obtained  from  the  insurance
companies,  it  is  to  their  advantage  to  recommend  that  the  affiliate  operate  with  the  life
insurance  company  offering  the  best  brokerage  commission,  even  though  that  companv  may
not  offer  the  best  pension.  Besides,  since  the  brokerage  commission  is part  of  life  insurance
companv  expenses,  it  may  be  assumed  that  there  is  an  inverse  relationship  between  the
commission  paid  to  the  broker  and  the amount  of  the  pension.
The  Insurance  Superintendency  reacted  by  establishing  a  senous  of  regulations  that
attempt  to  increase  market  transparency.  When  purchasing  a  life  annuity,  the  future
pensioner  must  present  three  equivalent  life  annuity  quotes  issued  by  different  life  insurance
companies.  The  commission  received  by  the  broker  must  be  stamped  on  the  first  page  of
the  policy.  Insurance  brokerage  activity  is  regulated  in  an  effort  to  ensure  the  brokers'
suitability,  reliability,  and  independence.
In  an  attempt  to  overcome  these  flaws  in  the  life  annuity  market,  the  Executive
Branch  submitted  a bill  to Congress  in  1995 that  would  replace  the  current  brokerage  svstem
with  an  electronic  system  of  life annuity  consultations  and  sales.  It was  first  presented  to the
Senate,  where  it  was  analyzed  by  the  Finance  and  Labor  Commissions,  and  the  President
then  introduced  other  amendments  tightening  restrictions  on  the  conditions  for  taking  earlv
retirement.  A  consensus  was  not  reached  on  these  changes,  and  progress  on  the  bill  has
come  to  a standstill.
28 Frugone  (1992).
25111.3  Supervision  and Guarantees
An  important  aspect  of  the  design  of  the  benefit  stage  of  the  system  is  set  of
safeguards provided by the government  in the form of supervision  and guarantees.
The supervision of annuity providers is in most cases, quite different  from that applied
to  pension  fund  managers.  In  Argentina,  Chile  and  Peru,  pension  fund  managers  are
supervised  by  newly created  agency with  a  sigrificant  level  of autonomy,  both  in  terms  of
policy  decisions  and  budget.  The  exception  here  is  Colombia,  where  the  supernision  of
pension  fund is responsibility  of the banking  supernision  agency. 29 On  the other  hand, the
new annuity providers  are supervised in each of the  four countries  by the existing insurance
supervisorv agency (which is also the  Banking supervisor  in Colombia).  This  decision  was
based  on  the premise  that annuities are just a particular  type of insurance and, consequently
standard  supervisory  practices  for  other  insurance  product  could  be  applied  to  the  new
branch.  Following  this  logic,  existing  insurance  companies  were  authorized  to  offer
annuities  in the market,  departing  from the criterion established  for pension  fund managing
companies, which have to be single purpose  firms.
Marketing  supervision  is well  designed  in  Peru,  where  the  Supervision  of  Pension
Funds  establishes the  regulations  and  applies them,  but  it is quite  poor  in  other  countries
(where  the  regulatory  problems  discussed  above  are  usually  exacerbated  by  weak
supervision).  One  critical area  is  the  investment  of  reserves.  Insurance  companies  are
required to invest the assets that back their cornmitments  in certain  instruments,  in order  to
assure  diversification and  reduce  risk.  Table  9 below  summarizes  the limits in Argentina,
Chile  and  Peru.  Colombian  regulators  also  impose  (somewhat  arcane) investment  limnits.
Forty  percent  of reserves  must  be invested  in liquid  and  conservative  instruments  such as
government  bonds or bank deposits.
Table  9  Investment  limits for annuity providers  in three countries
Argentina  Chile  Peru
Type  of Instrument
Federal  Government  Bonds  100%  50%  30%
Local  Governments  Bonds  30%  0%  0%
Foreign  Government/Multilateral  Bonds  10%  10%  30%
Corporate  Bonds  60%  40%  10%
Stocks,  equity  shares  40%  30%
Foreign  Corporate  Bonds  and Stocks  10%  10%  10%
Certificates  of Deposit  60%  40%  20%
Real  estate  0%  0  30%
Mortgage  Guaranteed  Bonds  60%  30%  30%
Mutual  Funds  30%  10%  30%
Foreign  Mortgage  Guaranteed  Bonds  10%  0%  ?
Derivatives  2%  ?  0%
Direct  Lending  with  Mortgage  Guarantee  10%  0%  0%
Direct  Lending  with  other  guarantees  10%  0%  0%
26In  Peru,  while  the  Supervision  of  Pension  Funds  makes  a  significant  effort  to
introduce  transparency  at  the  individual  level, there  is no  available  information  at  the  macro
level.  Neither  the  Supervision  of  Pension  Funds,  nor  the  Supen-ision  of  Banking  and
Insurance  publish  any  specific  data  on  annuities  in their  monthlv,  quarterlv  or  annuaL reports.
The  Supervision  of  Pension  Funds  linits  its  information  to  the  number  of  beneficiaries,  bv
type  of  benefit  (retirement,  survivors,  disabled),  residence,  AFP  and  formn  of  pavment
(annuity  vs.  scheduled  withdrawal).  There  is no  mention  of  the  existence  of  different  types
of  annuities  in the  reports.
Similarly,  in  its  annual  report  SBS  publishes  detailed  information  on  the  financial
status  of  each  insurance  company,  including  production,  balance  sheets,  et  cetera.  The
reports  includes  data  for  each  branch  of  insurance,  such  as  life,  homes  and  personal
propertv,  disabiLitv  and  survivors  and  annuities.  However,  no  specific  data  useful  for
prospective  retirees  are  included.  This  lack  of  public  information  makes  extremely  difficult
for  retiring  workers  to  make  an  educated  choice,  and  meanwhile  they  are  exposed  to
influences  from  AFP  or  insurance  companies  employees.
In  contrast  to  the  AFPs,  there  are  no  daily  reporting  requirements.  Valuation  practices
also  tend  to  be  lax  relative  to  what  is  applied  during  the  accumulation  phase.  The
requirements  for  segregation  of  assets  between  the  company  and  the  reserves  or  the  use  of
custodian  institutions  are  not  as  nearly  as  strict.  Reports  are  made  on  a  quarterlv  basis,
returns  on  investment  of  reserves  are  calculated  by  the  companies  and  there  are  no
predefined  methodologies  that  can  be  replicated.;°
The  problems  found  in  annuitv  market  supervision  can  be  attributed,  in  part,  to  the
application  of  a philosophy  more  suitable  to  supervise  a voluntarv  and  relatively  small  scale
insurance  industry.  Proposals  to  give  full supervisory  authority  over  annuities  to  the  pension
fund  supervisory  agencies  have  been  promoted  in  Argentina  and  Chile  as  a  wav  to
harmonize  supervision  criteria  in  the  accumulation  and  payout  stages.  However,  some  risks
have  also  been  mentioned,  as  for  example,  the  possibility  of  distracting  the  attention  of
pension  fund  supervisors.  Assessing  the  success  of  this  approach  will have  to wait  until  the
proposal  is full implemented  in one  country.
Guarantees  apply  to the  annuities  in each  of  the  countries  except  Peru  as well  as to the
solvencv  of  the  AFPs  where  scheduled  withdrawals  are  held.  In  Colombia,  annuities  are
guaranteed  through  FOGAFIN,  a governmental  deposit  insurance  agency.  These  guarantees
are  to  be  paid  after  liquidation  of  the  insurance  firms,  and  social  security  obligations  are  first
priority  claims  in bankruptcv  procedures.  When  full  transfer  of  reserves  to  another  insurer  is
not  possible,  pensions  are  to  be  paid  through  pension  fund  managers,  AFPs,  which  will also
be  the  channel  for paying  these  guarantees.
29  Amnong other  Latin  American  countries  that  have  reformned their  pension  funds  and  are  not
included  in this  study,  Uruguav  is the  other  case  where  pension  fund  supervision  was  assigned  to the
banking  supervisory  agency.  See Rofman  and Demarco  (1998).
30  This  contrasts  for  examnple, wxith  the  practice  in  Argentina  in  regulating  AFJPs  in  which  the
supervisor  calculates  the  value  of assets  dailv for  each  pension  fund.
27The  Chilean government  guarantees  life annuity  payments  up  to  100 percent  of the
minimum  pension  or 75 percent  of the difference between  the pension paid by the company
and  the  minimum  pension,  with a limit of 45 UF per  month.  Meanwhile, in Argentina,  the
guarantee  is limited  to  a  monthly  payment  of  five times  the  maximum  basic  pension,  or
about  1.6 times the average wage of the economy.  Finally, there  is no  explicit guarantee on
the benefit  stage in Peru.  We are not aware of any analyses of the potential  liability implied
by these guarantees.  This is not surprising  however, since even estimates of liabilities arising
from guarantees  during  the accumulation  period are rare.31
111.4 Sjystem  maturation  and capital  market  development
There  is a  growing  recognition  of  the  role  of  contractual  savings  and  institutional
investors  in the  development  of  capital markets  around  the world. 32 The  analyses suggest
that the presence  of institutional  investors  managing large pools  of long term  savings helps
provide  liquidity  and  stability  to  the  capital  markets,  may  help  extend  the  duration  of
corporate  and  government  debt,  contribute  to  the  creation  of  new instruments  and  even
improve  the quality of capital market infrastructure.  The long term nature of the liabilities of
pension  funds and  insurance  companies  help extend the yield curve and provide  funds with
long term capital.  There  is even some evidence that they mav help improve  the performance
of the corporate  sector through  improved governance.
Not  surprisingly, with regard to  the private pension  sector,  the focus has been on  the
accumulation  stage. 33 However,  in  the long  run,  the insurance  sector may  also experience
dramatic  growth  as  these  schemes  mature.  The  initial  stages  of  this  process  are already
evident  in  Chile  but  as  shown  in  Figure  4,  the  growth  is just  beginning.  By  2020,  the
potential  annuitant  population  in Colombia  and  Peru could reach 200,000.  There  could be
one million annuitants  in Chile by the end of the next decade while the same milestone could
be reached in Argentina  by 2020.
31  See Pennachi (1998) for one example.
32  For example,  see Blommenstein  and Funke (1998)  and Catalan  and Musalem  (forthcoming).
33  For example,  Holzmann (1997) and Walker et al., (forthcoming).
28Figure  4  Projected  number  of potential  annuitants  through  2020
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Tlhe  design  of  the  payout  stage,  combined  with  individuals'  preferences  for
decumulation  of  assets  during  retirement  will  have  a  major  impact  on  the  capital  markets
where  these  schemes  mature.  If withdrawal  rules  are  liberal,  the  maturation  of  the  scheme
could  lead  to  a sharp  reduction  in balances  held.  with  potential  consequences  for asset  prices
and  inflation.34 On  the  other  hand,  limitations  on  withdrawals  and  mandated  annuitization
could  generate  a  massive  accumulation  of  assets  in  the  insurance  sector.  Will  the  domestic
capital  markets  provide  sufficient  outlets  with  appropriate  instruments  such  as  indexed
bonds  to accommodate  the  growth  in this  sector?
Since  conditions  for taking  lump  sum  payments  out  of  the  system  are  quite  stnct,  most
of  the  funds  accumulated  will remain  under  the  management  of  either  AFPs  or  insurance
companies.  The  pace  of  the  accumulation  in  the  benefit  industry  will  differ  for  other
reasons  however.  In  the  long  run,  the  growth  of  assets  backing  benefits  depends  on
coverage  rates,  the  contribution  rate,  the  net  rate  of  return  on  investments  and  the  ratio  of
working  to  retirement  years.
34  The  evidence  for  life  cvcle  savings  patterns  among  the  elderlv  is mixed,  however.  For  example,
Boersch-Supan  (1994)  finds  that  elderly  German  households  save  a  substantial  portion  of  their
income.  Whili1e  there  is  similar  evidence  in the  US,  Attanasio  and  Hovnes  (1995)  find  that  correcting
wealth  data  for  differential  survival  probabilities  within  cohorts  reveals  more  life  cvcle decumulation
of  assets  in the  case  of the  U.S..
29In the  short  run  (5-10 years), there  are two important  factors  to consider.  The first is
the  design of the benefits  that  are paid  to who  die or become disabled prior  to retirement.
These  are necessarily defined  benefit  products  and therefore  are provided by  the insurance
sector in the form  of annuities.  In the earlv years, these  are the main source  of demand  for
benefit products  and  the primary business of the annuity providers.  In all four countries, the
disability and  survivors  benefits  have been  privatized  alongside the old age benefit.  This is
typical in Latin America  with  the notable  exception  of Mexico, but not  in other  multipillar
schemes such as those in Europe.3s
The pace of growth also depends  on two elements of the switching strategy.  The first
is the method  of compensating  individuals for the rights that they had already accrued in the
public scheme  prior  to joining the private one.  The second is the "target  switching age" or
the  age  of  the  oldest  workers  that  are  allowed  or  encouraged  to  switch  to  the  funded
scheme.36
In Chile, all workers  received a "recognition  bond"  at the  time of the reforrn, with a
face  value  estimated  to  be  close  to  what  they  would  have  accumulated  if  they  had
contributed  to  a fully funded  scheme  instead of  the PAYG  system in the years before  the
reform.  These  bonds  yield  a  real  4%  interest  rate,  and  they  are  fully  paid  at  time  of
retirement  or  survivors/disability  benefits  granting.  All beneficiaries  of  the  new  system,
even those who  retired  or became disabled imnmediately  after the reform,  had a large balance
available to buy an annuity.
In  Peru,  the  process  was  similar  but  operational  and  fiscal  problems  limited  its
implementation.  Specifically, the government  concluded  that it was not possible to calculate
the  amount  that  corresponded  to  each worker.  This  was solved by  assigning an amount
proportional  to  age  and  income  at  the  time  of  the  reformn.  Despite  the  fact  that  the
recognition  bonds would  pay zero real interest, there  were serious fiscal problems  in paying
off the bonds  of those retiring, becomning  disabled or dying. This problem was resolved with
two  different  methods.  Retiring  workers  (very few, due  to  the  sttong  incentive  to  older
workers to stay in the old system) were paid their bonds,  although with significant delays.
For survivors  and disability beneficiaries, a "temporary  regime", scheduled to last until
December  1999, was created.  Under  this scheme,  disability and  survivors benefits  are paid
directly by  the insurance  company  that  cover the AFP  to complement  the necessary capital
to acquire an annuity.  Under  the original design, once  the right for a disability or survivors
benefit  is established,  the necessary  capital  to buy  an annuity  for  the value  of the  defined
benefit  was calculated, then  the balance  of the individual account  (including the recognition
bond)  was  subtracted  and  the  remaining  required  funds  were  supplied  by  the  insurance
company.  Under  this  temporary  regime,  the  balance  of  the  accounts  (without  the
recognition  bonds  whose value  is sometimes  known,  but  never  paid) is transferred  to  the
insurance  company.  They  then  pay the benefit  while the  bond  amount  is determined  and
paid.  These complexities have limnited  the number  of annuities in Peru.
35 The Swiss scheme splits the disability  benefit between public and private sectors while the Polish
and Hungarian pension reforms left disability  and survivors  in the public  pillar.
36  See Palacios  and Whitehouse (1999)  for a discussion  of switching  strategies.
30In  Argentina,  a  completely  different  approach  was  taken.  In  the  case  of  retirees,
transitional  benefits  (that is, the  equivalent to  recognition  bonds)  are paid  monthly  by the
public pension agency and  retirees can acquire an annuity  for  the balance  of their individual
accounts.  These balances  are verv small at first due  to the short  period  of accumulation.  A
worker  retired  in  1998 or  1999 in Argentina would,  on  average,  receive  a benefit  of about
75%/o  of his previous  salary. Of that, appro.ximately 57% is paid by the public pension agency
as the  first pillar benefit,  37% is also paid bv the  public pension  agencv as the  transitional
benefit and  onlv 6%/o  is paid bv the annuitv.  Naturallv, as the scheme  matures  the  ransition
benefit  wvill  be replaced by the  annuitv.  But  clearly, the  fact that  a recognition  bond  is not
used reduces  the size of assets in the annuity market substantiallv.
The situation in Colombia is similar to that of Chile in the first  few years. Recognition
Bonds  are normallv  granted  and paid,  but, due  to  the strong  segmentation  by age between
the old and  new system  (73%10  of members  of the new system are 35 vears old or younger),
there  are  almost  no  retirees  under  the  fully  funded  scheme.  However,  the  number  of
beneficiaries  of sur-vivor benefits  has been growing,  and  it is now  over  2000.  The  limited
size of  the  potential  market,  current  and  in  the medium  term,  produce  a  relative  lack of
interest by companies,  and competition  is not very strong.
The link between  institutional  conditions  and market  development  appears  clear: In a
country  like Chile,  where  annuity  capital are  large  and  the  system  is  mature  enough  to
produce  significant  demand,  competition  has  been  strong,  with  marketing  strategies,
partcipation  of brokers,  et cetera.  In Argentina  competition  has  been  strong,  but onlv for
survivors benefits, and marketing  strategies have been oriented  in that direction.  In any case,
most annuity providers  are linked to pension fund managers  and the companies  tend  to plan
their commercial  strategy together.  Finally, the cases of Colombia and Peru  show that, if the
compulsory  system is small, markets  cannot fully develop  and  the  annuity  business,  at least
in the short  and medium term, will be reduced.
From  the point  of view of capital market impact,  the important  indicator  is projected
reserves.  In Chile, annuitv reserves  amounted  in December  1997 to  US$9,600 millions,  or
approximately  13.5% of GDP.  This  is expected  to  double  in the  next  two  decades  and
continue  growing thereafter.  Rofman  & Stirparo (1998) project  the stock of annuitv reserves
in Argentina  (now at less than  0.5%  of GDP)  will reach  20% of GDP  by 2030 and 50% by
2050.  This  ratio will be somewhat  lower in Peru and  Colombia given  that coverage is more
lirnited  in both  countries.  Nevertheless,  the  magnitudes  involved will extend  the  role  of
institutional  investors, especially insurance companies, in the development  of capital markets
far beyond the accumulation  stage.
31IV.  Public  policy  objectives,  costs  and preferences
While  the effects  of multipillar benefit  design on  savings and  the  capital markets  are
important,  the  primary  rationale  for  restrictions  during  the payout  phase  is to  ensure  that
workers  transforn  decades  of  accumulated  savings  into  a  secure  stream  of income  after
retirement.  The  main  public  policy  objective  is to  mnitigate  the  risk  of poverty  or  sharp
reduction  in consumption  during old age.  The key tool for reducing this risk is an annuitv.
Economists  have long noted  the welfare  gains from  annuitization.37  Annuities  allow
individuals  to consume more than they would if they had to self-insure against longevity risk.
Intuitively, by pooling tdhis  risk the wealth of those who  die earlv is eventually consumed  by
annuitants  that live longer.  Unintended  bequests  do not  occur and  ex ante, all participants
gain from purchasing the annuities.
Empirically,  voluntar,  purchase  of  annuities  in  the  private  market  is  uncomnon,
however.  Why was this the  case despite  the  large potential  welfare  gains?  There  were  a
number  of good  reasons  that people did not bu;  annuities, but the literature  has focused on
adverse selection.  This led to a significant body  of literature measuring the extent  of adverse
selection  and determining if this was the reason  that the annuities markets  never  developed.
The answer to this question bears directly on benefit policies in multipillar pension  schemes.
IV. I  Adverse selection  as explanation  for low annuiy demand
Since the original empirical study by Friedman and Warshawsky in  1988, a number  of
economists  have produced  estimates of the difference between the price of an actuarially fair
annuity  and the price observed in the market.  This has been interpreted  as adverse selection.
According  to this  explanation, individuals  have knowledge  of their  own  mortality  risk that
annuity  providers  find costly or impossible  to obtain.  This information  asymmetry leads to a
market  failure as individuals that expect  to live for a long time purchase  annuities  and sellers
raise  their  prices  to  compensate.  In  the  end,  the  market  fails to  materialize  because  the
average individual finds the price of the armuity too high.
Most  of the studies have  used data from  the  US and  have found  that  actuarially fair
annuities  calculated using population  life tables  are between  6 and  14  percent  higher  than
those  actually observed in the market. 38 It was also noted  that  annuitants  lived longer  than
average  providing  evidence  of  adverse  selection.  This  could  explain  the  failure  for  the
annuity  market  to  develop  if individuals  with  average mortality were  not  willing to  accept
37 As first described by Yaari  (1965).
-'8  See for example,  Poterba and Warshawsky  (1999)  and Mitchell  et. al. (1997).
32pnces  based  on long  lived annuitants.;9  Data  from  other  countries  including  Australia and
the UK y  ielded simnilar  results.'
Several other  reasons  for low annuity  demand  have been  cited. 41 Among  these are (i)
intrafamilv  substitute  arrangements,  (ii)  precautionarv  savings  (especially- health),  (iii)
transaction  costs,  (iv) other  forms  of annuitized  wealth (especially public  pensions),  and  (v)
bequests.  In addition,  to  this  list we  can  add  the  low  credibilitv attributed  to  long  term
private contracts  in many developing  countries.  The appropriate  policy response  to the low
demand  for  pnrvate  annuities  will  depend  on  the  extent  to  which  these  factors  and  not
adverse selection are to blame.
Some  of  these  factors  appear  to  be  quite  important.  For  example,  Kothkoff  and
Spivak (1981) found  that families can makle arrangements  among themselves  so as to achieve
as  much  as  70  percent  of  the  welfare  gain  provided  by  an  actuarially  fair  annuitv.
Furthermore,  the  larger  the  family  the  more  efficient  this  informal  arrangement.  While
subsequent  studies did not find much  evidence of this phenomenon  in the US context, 42 it is
more  plausible in a  developing  countrv  context  where  traditional  famiil  structure,  are still
strong and families are larger.
Kotlikoff  (1988)  presented  a  stylized  model  that  precautionary  savings  for  health
could be quite powerful  especially where  health  insurance is not available.  Again, this result
is especially relevant for developing  countries where  health insurance coverage is verv low.
Friedman  and  Warshawsky  (1990) looked  at  the  interaction  of  two  other  possible
determinants  of annuity demand  - public pensions  and bequests.  Their  model assumed  that
individuals in the US alreadv hold half of total wealth in the form  of public pensions.  Thev
found  that under  reasonable  assumptions  about  bequest motives  and risk aversion,  the effect
of the  cost  of adverse  selection was great  enough  to explain  the low demand  for  annuities
observed  in the US.
One  problem  with  this  approach  however  is that  it  does not  differentiate  between
individuals  with  different  levels  of  income  or  wealth.  This  could  be  important  since, as
Walliser (1999) suggests, what mav be picked up by the adverse selection studies is actually a
correlation  between income and mortality.
"In  other words, higher income people buy more annuities because they have more wealth,
and the observation that annuitants live longer than average arises because higher income
people also tend to live  longer."
39 The so-called  "money's worth" ratios were often even lo-wer  if interest rates on alternative long
term risk- investments  such as corporate bonds were used to discount the annuitv stream.
4)  For example, Finkelstein and Poterba  (1999) for the UK and Bateman and Piggott ('1999)  for
Australia. James and Vittas (1999) present results for the UK, Australia, Switzerland, Israel and
Chile.
41  Walliser  (1999)  provides a good overview.
42  Altonji et. al.(1992,  19977).
33Further  evidence  that  this  mav  indeed  be  the  path  of causalitv  comes  from  two  studies
of  older  households.  The  first  is an  attempt  to adjust  cohort-specific  wealth  data  to  take into
account  mortality  patterns  bv Attanasio  and  Hoynes  (1995).  The  authors  estimate  the  wealth
- mortality  relationship  for  the  US  in  the  mid-1980s.  They  find  a  close  correlation  between
the  two  variables.4 ;  Moreover,  as  shown  below  in  Figure  5,  the  data  reveal  that  most  of  the
observed  difference  in  mortalitv  rates  is between  the  poorest  quartile  in  the  distribution  and
the  other  three  quartiles.
Figure 5  Wealth and mortality  by quartile in the United  States
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Source:  Attanasio  and Hovnes  (1995).
Next,  we  note  that  with  the  exception  of  bequests,  which  tend  to  be  more  important
for  the  very  richest  households,  the  factors  listed  earlier  that  reduce  demand  for  annuities
would  tend  to  affect  the  high  mortality  group  most.  Transactions  costs,  precautionary
savings  and  intrafamily  transfers  (poorer  households  have  more  members)  are  more  likely to
reduce  the  demand  for  annuities  in  the  bottom  quartile  of  the  wealth  distribution.  In  the
US  case,  the  factor  that  is likely to  be  most  important  in  our  view,  namely,  the  proportion  of
total  wealth  already  held  in the  form  of  an  annuity  - also  affects  the  lowest  quartile  most.
43  Pappas  et. al. (1993),  find a  strong  correlation  between  income  and  mortality  in the  U:S in the
mid-1980s.  They also find that the relationship  has become  more pronounced  over the previous  two
decades.
34This  can  be  seen  in  Figure  6  which  is  based  on  data  from  the  Retirement  Health
Survev  (RHS),  Wave  1 as reported  in  Gustmann  et.  al. (1997).  The  bars  show  the  percentage
of  total  wealth  that  is held  in the  form  of public  and  pri-ate  pensions  that  pav  annuities.  The
sample  includes  households  wvith  heads  aged  51  to  61 in  1992.  For  this  group  approaching
the  normal  retirement  age,  slightlv  more  than  half  of wealth  was held  in the  form  of  a private
or  public  pension.
The  ratio  is  inverselv  related  to  total  wealth.  Households  in  the  first  quartile  have
more  than  100  percent  of  their  wealth  annuitized  wsith almost  all  of  it  coming  from  the
public  pension  scheme.  The  figure  for the  median  group  is just  over  60 percent.  Finallv,  the
nchest  quartile  has  about  one  third  of  their  wealth  in  annuitized  form.  In  other  words,  the
quartile  with  the  least  wealth  has  both  the  highest  proportion  of  pre-annuitized  wealth  and
the  highest  mortality  rates.  This  evidence  supports  the  possibilit-  that  much  of  what  is
observed  as  adverse  selection  is at  least  partly  the  result  of  other  factors  that  lead  those  with
less  wealth  to  eschew  annuities  resulting  in the  observation  that  annuitants  live  longer  than
the  rest  of  the  population.4
Figure  6  Proportion of total wealth  already annuitized
among  older US households  in 1992
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Source:  Gustmann  et. al., (1997) Tables 15-18.
44  Brown  (1999) finds that  annuitv demand  falls as wealth rises.  This result  ma! be due  tc:  a biased
sample  since he  uses  onlv RHS  households  that  have  defined  contribution  accounts  and  are  still
working.  The  reported  average wealth numbers  are 21 percent  higher  than  the means  for  the RHS
sample  population  suggesting  that Brown's  sample is concentrated  in the  top quartile of  the  wealth
distribution.  Thus, he may be observing  the effects of bequest motives in the wealthiest group.
35The implication is that policymakers should pay attention  to the other factors involved
in  determining  demand  for  annuities  in  designing benefits  for  multipillar  schemes.  For
example, the existence of strong informal  svstems of old age support  and large families mav
be an important  factor in some  societies.  If a significant part of the welfare gain is already
being  provided  by  this  mechanism,  a  mandated  annuitv  may  either  crowd  it  out  or  be
perceived  as less useful.  It  will certainly reduce  the net welfare  gain  for  many individuals
derived  from  making  an  annuity  available.  On  the  other  hand,  the  extension  of  health
insurance could lead to  lower demand  for precautionary  savings and  a greater willingness to
annuitize.  And  perhaps  most  importandy,  the size of the  first pillar should be  considered
when  designing  second  pillar benefits  since  the  sum  of  the  two  together  represents  total
annuitized wealth.
To complicate matters, there  are several factors that were not mentioned  in our list but
which  are very  relevant  for  the  four  Latin  American  countries  covered  here.  The  first  is
partial coverage.  The difference  between population  mortality tables and  the tables that  the
industry  uses  was  noted  in  Section  I,  Table  1.  In  each  case,  the  approved  tables  for
calculating annuities  assumed  lower  mortality rates than  for  either  the  current  or projected
population  life tables.  At  first,  this  may  seem to  reduce  annuities  below  their  fair levels.
However,  it is to be  expected  that  the population  tables will exhibit higher mortality  rates
than  what  will take  place  among  the  members  of  these  schemes.  This  is  because  the
schemes cover a particular subset  of the labor  force  - a subset  that is likely to have higher-
than-average  life expectancies.  If differences  in mortality patterns  bv wealth  are similar to
those  found  in  the  US  and  other  countries  the  gap  between  covered  and  uncovered
population  may be great.
The lack of annuitant  history  does cause a problem  for a new multipillar scheme  and
debates  continue  over which  is the correct  table to use. 45 Nevertheless,  we would anticipate
that despite  the mandatory  nature  of the schemes, partial coverage will lead to  a significant
discrepancy between annuitants'  life expectancy and that of the population.  Once  again, this
would not be due to adverse selection but rather to the factors that lead to informality, many
of which  are correlated with income which in turn, is correlated with mortality.
4;  See for example,  SOA (1996)
36I  -' 2 Afnnuiz  prices  and  moneg's  worth'  ratios
Figure 7 below compares the monthlv  pavment  that could be purchased  with  S100,000
in  the US, Canada  and  the LUK  with  quotes  from  our  four Latin  Amencan  countrnes. The
data are taken  from several different  studies but refer  to the same type of individual  and are
the same type of annuitv.  There  are four cases shown  where  the annuity  is indexed  to prices
- UK3, Chile, Colombia and Peru while the rest  are nominal annuities.  Also, the Argentine
annuitv allows the holder to share in returns in excess of four percent.
For noninal  annuities, the range lies between  about  $700 and  S880 per  month.  The
real annuities  range from  around  620 in  the  UK  to  almost  820 in Chile.  Interestingly,  the
indexed  annuitv  in  the UK  pays a much  lower  amount  than  three  of  the Latin  Amencan
markets  - and  60 percent less than  in Chile.  Part of the explanation  is obviouslv due to the
fact  that  Chilean annuitants  have  life  expectancies  that  are  five percent  lower  thian their
(voluntarv)  counterparts  in  the  UK  and  real  interest  rates  are  higher  in  Chile.  Also
noteworthv  is the fact that among  the four Latin American  countries there  is no relationship
between  life expectancv  and  annuitv  amount.  Unfortunately,  because  life  expectancy  of
annuitants,  interest  rates and even the  competitiveness  of the insurance  industrv vary across
countries,  these  figures do not  tell us how  close these  amounts  come  to  providing  a "fair"
annuity in each country.
With  the  exception  of persons  over  75  in the  United  Kingdom,  the  purchase  of an
annuity  is not  mandatorv  in any  of these  countries.  Individuals  voluntarily  purchasing  an
annuitv  presumably  find them  worthwhile.  The question  is to what  extent  their  consumer
surplus  is reduced  by  the  load  factors  that  create  a  gap  between  the  actual  and  the  fair
annuity.  This type  of calculation is referred  to  as a "money's  worth"  calculation  and  it is
problematic  for several reasons.  Fitst, many countries  do not have annuitant  mortality tables
or projected  life tables.  These would have to be assumed  for the purposes  of the calculation.
Second,  few countries  have long  term  bonds  of  any kind.  -Some  proxy  would  have  to be
found  in order to make the calculation.  In other  words,  the ratio would be primanly  driven
by the assumptions  which themselves would be largely arbitrary.)
Monev's  worth  ratios  also  ignore  other  important  factors  for  cross  countrv
compansons  such as insurer  nrsk.  For example,  three  of the  four Latin Amenrcan countries
that are the subject of this study, provide  government  guarantees  for a significant portion  of
the annuitv while the other countries do not.
Finallv, where  projected  life expectancv  tables  are  available, they  ignore  uncertainty.
Official demographers  have made  serious errors  in forecasting  mortahtv- over  this centurv.y4
This has led some demographers  to  suggest  a stochastic  approach  reinforcing  the idea that
the  outcome  faced  by the annuitv  seller is uncertain.  The money's  worth  calculation  does
not take this nsk into account.  This uncertaintv  could help explain observed  annuity pnrces.
46  Even  the  concept  of  a "nskless"  long  term  bond  mav  also  be  more  appropriate  in some  countries
than  others.
47  See Lee and  Tuljapurkar  (1998).
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IV.3  Mandates  andpreferences
The  last  two  sections  suggest  caution  when  mandating  annuities.  Annui't  markets
may  not  exist  already  not  because  of  market  failure, but  because  of  other  factors  that  reduce
demand  for  them,  like intrafamily  contracts.  Broad  mandates  may  lead  to  overannuitization,
especially  for  lower  income  individuals.
Similarly,  there  mav  be  some  ment  to  offering  flexible  annuity  products.  Piggott  and
Bateman  (1999)  show  the  potential  welfare  gains  of  offering  a  wider  variety  of  annuity
instruments  ranging  from  term  certain  to  vanrable  annuities  and  with  different  degrees  of
indexation.  Thev  conclude  that  welfare  gains  can  be  quite  significant  under  reasonable
assumptions  about  the  heterogeneity  of  member  preferences.  They  find  that  variable
annuities  in particular,  can  substantially  raise welfare  of  individuals  with  normal  levels  of  risk
aversion.  Diaz  and  Edwards  (1999) propose  a new  type  of  benefit  for  the  Chilean  pension
system  that  behaves  like a vanrable  annuity  product,  but  also  passes  along  demographic  risk
to  the  annuitant  (see Box  3 below).
38These  proposals  imply  certain  potential  tradeoffs,  however.  First,  the  lack  of
transparency  and  potential  for  misinformation  and  fraud  has  alreadv been  noted.  More
complicated products  would potentiallv  make it easier for unscrupulous  salespersons  to take
advantage of their clients.  The state of insurance  regulation is also a potential obstacle  w,hen
proposing  more  complex  instruments.  In the short  run, there  are likely to be adv-antges  to
keeping the choices simple during the earlv vears of the svstem.
Box 3  Sharing risk for better annuities - a Chilean proposal
Since the mid-1990s. a small group of Chilean academics have promoted an annuity
product  that  would  combine  some of  the  better  features  of  scheduled  withdraxVxals  and
standard  life annuities.*  The "mensualidad  vitalicia"  (MV)  allows  workers  to buy  longevity
insurance while potentially earning higher - and riskier - investment returns than wAould  be
implicit in a standard annuity.  The NIV is not just  a variable annuity however because  it
does  not  provide  full  protection  against  longevity  increases experienced by  the  group.
Instead, unexpected increases in life expectancy result in automatic reductions in monthly
payments.  This self-insurance for  structural changes in mortality reduces the cost  of the
annuity.  And unlike the scheduled withdrawal, the individual is still insured against simply
living longer than the average for the cohort.
The trouble with the proposal is that irreversible contracts like annuities can lead to
agency problems.  In an insurance company, the shareholders lose if returns are poor.  But
what is the incentive to the provider of the MV?  One possibility would be a complex and
costly charge tied to performance - in effect, a system of guarantees.  Another possibilty
would  be  a  closed mutual  fund operation  in  which  management could  be removed  by
disgruntled annuitants.  The authors suggest another  mechanism - one consistent with the
underlving philosophy of the Chilean pension system.  This mechanism is competition.
Individuals would commit to irreversible annuity purchases but they could move their
variable annuity balances between specialized investment funds searching for the best risk-
adjusted return.  This would resolve the  incentive inconsistency problem for the pension
fund managers but it raises another problem.  What  if short-lived annuitants move from
Fund A to Fund B leaving Fund A with above average life expectancy? The solution, say the
Chileans, is to introduce a system-wide insurance that would compensate any fund whose
mortality experience differed from the experience of all annuitants covered.
This system would shift structural  demographic risk and  investment risk from the
shareholders of the insurance company to  the members of the scheme.  In exchange, the
members would receive higher and more volatile pensions.  In effect, this strips the benefit
stage down to  its most  essential function - protection  against outliving  one's  retirement
savings based on current projected life tables.  Individuals can then choose their investments
based on their own risk aversions.
* See Valdes and Edwards (1998) and Diaz and Edwards (1994 and 1999).
39In  the  long  run,  these  problems  can  be  overcome.  Financial  literacv  and  consumer
salvvy will increase  over  time.  In  fact,  public  policy  can  play  a role  in making  this  happen.48
As  is true  for  the  process  of  investment  during  the  accumulation  stage,  the  success  of  the
new  DC  pension  systems  will  depend  to  a  great  extent  on  more  educated  consumers  of
financial  services.  Education  about  annuities  is part  of  that  process.
Nevertheless,  the  gradual  liberalization  of  the  benefit  stage  must  not  compromise  core
objectives.  For  this  reason,  we  believe  that  a minimum  level  of  annuitization  is required  to
meet  these  basic  objectives.  These  should  be  price  indexed  annuities  that  at  least  provide
protection  against  poverty  during  old  age  and/or  provide  a  pension  that  is higher  than  the
income  level  that  qualifies  an  individual  for  social  assistance.  In  other  words,  withdrawals  or
annuity  products  that  allow  participants  to  share  some  of  the  risks  should  be  introduced  only
after  the  basic  policy  objectives  are  ensured.  These  objectives  are  part  of  a  broader  social
protection  policy  and  include  measures  to  reduce  potential  moral  hazard  associated  with
other  social  assistance  programs  or  guarantees. 49
The  actual  level  of  minimum  annuitization  will  depend  on  each  country's  objectives
with  respect  to  poverty  definitions  and  consumption  smoothing  goals.  Nevertheless,  our
earlier  discussion  regarding  the  role  of  public  pensions  and  pre-annuitized  wealth  other  than
that  provided  by  the  second  pillar  suggest  that  the  level  should  be  inversely  related  to  the
size  of  the  first  pillar.  In  fact,  practice  around  the  world  appears  to  be  just  the  opposite.
Sweden,  Hungary  and  Poland  have  verv  large  first  pillars  but  force  annuitization  of  all
second  pillar  accumulations  while  Chile  and  Peru  have  no  contributorv  first  pillar  and  vet
they  allow  for  scheduled  withdrawals  and,  under  certain  circumstances,  lump  sum  payouts.
Hong  Kong  and  Australia  have  means-tested  plans  but  no  minimum  annuitization  in  their
second  pillars.  While  different  policies  are  to  be  expected  in  such  a  diverse  group  of
countries,  it is not  clear  that  mandatory  annuitization  policies  have  been  determined  on  the
basis  of clear  public  policy  objectives.5"
IV.4  Inslitutional arrangemenis  for  the benefit  stage of the multipillar scheme
All  four  countries  in  this  study  chose  a  privately-managed  and  decentralized
arrangement  for  benefit  providers.  Several  altemative  arrangements  have  been  proposed
including  (i)  a  state  monopoly  provider  (ii)  a  single,  private  concession  based  on  an
international  competitive  bidding  process  and  (iii)  a  bidding  process  to  contract  private
48  Note  the new Chilean secondary  school  pension  course  recentlv added  to the  standard  curriculum
in 30 pilot schools (SAFP website, December  1999).
49  One  implication of this position  is that  the scheduled withdrawals  should be eliminated  below this
minimum  annuitization  requirement.  Diaz  and  Edwards  (1999) argue rather  half-heartedly  against
the  elimination of SWs in Chile.
5('  The same point can be made  about  taxation  of pension  benefits.  Both  Hong  Kong  and Australia
tax  annuities  but  not  lump  sum  distributions.  Discussions  with  experts  in those  countries  suggest
that this has not been the result  an explicit policy favoring the lump sum benefit.
40annuities  for  a specific  cohort.  Sweden  is the  only  countrv  to have  chosen  the  first  of  these
alternatives  and  this  has  not  vet  been  implemented.  The  idea  of  a  concession  based  on  an
international  bidding  process  is  similar  to  the  method  used  in  Bolivia  for  the  accumulation
penod.  In  that  case,  there  are  two  consortia  that  have  been  granted  duopolv  nights over  two
geographic  areas  of  the  country.  Bidding  was  based  mostlv  on  charges  to  rnembers,
although  vanous  other  conditions  had  to  be  met.  No  one  to  our  knowledge  is  considering
the  last  option  which  would  involve  finding  companies  to bid  for  the  annuitv  provision  of  an
entire  retiring  cohort  in a multipillar  system.
The  obvious  problem  with  the  first  option  is that  it reintroduces  the  government  into
the  direct  management  of assets  and  provider  of  services.  While,  as during  the  accumulation
stage,  mechanisms  to  insulate  the  funds  from  political  motives  could  be  created,  there  are  no
successful  expenrences  to  date.  In  fact,  public  management  of  pension  reserves  in  partially
funded  DB  schemes  has  universallv  led  to  poor  and  sometimes  dismal  returns.5'
Governments  would  also  be  tempted  to  spend  more  bv lending  itself  these  funds  outside  of
the  normal  market  channels.
Also,  depending  on  the  size  of  the  second  pillar  relative  to  the  economy  and  the
proportion  of  funds  that  must  be  kept  with  the  annuity  provider,  the  first  two  alternatives
could  lead  to  a  massive  concentration  of  assets  in  the  hands  of  one  institution  - whether
public  or  pnrvate.  This  would  fundamentallv  change  the  nature  of  ownership  of  industry,  in
the  countrv  when  the  scheme  matured  and  raise  difficult  questions  for  corporate
govemance.  Finallv,  the  bidding  process  itself  could  be  subject  to  corruption.
In  short,  while  it  may  make  sense  to  consider  a  private  concession  in  extremne  cases
where  the  market  is simply  too  small  to  support  several  providers,  a  decentralized  scheme  is
preferable  from  the  standpoint  of  competition.  Like  other  monopolies,  costs  may  be  lower
because  there  is  no  marketing  and  there  are  potential  economies  of  scale.  But  the  likelv
result  is poor  service  to consumers,  a distortionarv  impact  on  the  capital  markets  and  greater
political  risk.  While  this  paper  has  cited  some  of  the  problems  with  private  annuities
markets,  these  can  be  remedied  by regulation,  information  and  better  consumer  education.
There  are  several  options  within  the  decentralized  approach,  however.  Argentina
alone  among  the  four  countries  studied  here,  chose  specialized  annuitv  provider<;.  Some
analysts  have  argued  that  the  AFP  construct  has  raised  costs.52  The  same  logic  may  applv  to
the  annuity  industrv  although  we  are  not  aware  of  evidence  of  this  to  date,  partlv  because  of
the  imraturirv  of  the  schemes.  The  extra  cost  of  setting  aside  minimurnm capital  and  separate
infrastructure  is likely to  be  more  important  in the  smaller  markets  and  in the  earlv  stages  of
the  system.  The  danger  is that  competition  is reduced  because  fewer  firms  are  interested  in
participating  in a market  with  these  restnctions.
51 See Iglesias and Palacios  (1999).
52  See Shah (1996).
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1/' 1 Benefitpolig  in the  four counties
Our  review  of  the  benefit  policies of  four  Latin American  countries  revealed  more
similarities than  differences.  Each  restricted  withdrawals  so as to ensure  that public  policy
objectives with regard to minimurn pensions  and own replacement rates  were achieved.  On
the  other  hand,  all  four  countries  allowed  scheduled  withdrawals  that  do  not  provide
longeviry insurance.  This problem  is mitigated by minimum  pension guarantees in Chile and
Colombia  and by the  existence of a redistributive  first pillar in Argentina.  Annuity products
vary, but  all four countries  allow deferred  annuities,  guaranteed payment  periods  and  joint
annuities.  Except  for  Argentina,  where  indexation  is generally prohibited,  annuities  must
also carry inflation protection.
A  complex  set  of  regulations  for  annuitv  calculations  exists  in  each  country.
Regulators  specifv which  mortality  tables  and  interest rates  will be used  for calculating  the
annuity.  Commissions  are not regulated however,  and this is the basis for competition.  The
exception  is Argentina  where  competition  is also based  on  a partial  variable annuity  that
shares  annual investment  returns  above  four percent  with annuitants in a manner  that varies
across providers.
V.2  The  present  andfuture annuities  market
The restrictions  on withdrawals  force workers to either purchase some type of annuity
from  a  licensed  pro"vider or  to  take  the  scheduled  withdrawal  option.  A  substantial
proportion  of new retirees have  opted  for annuities including more  than  half of the quarter
million retired workers in Chile, despite restrictions  that prevent workers with relatively small
balances  from doing so.
The  growth  of  the Chilean  annuities  market  has fueled a boom  in  the life insurance
industry where  premium  income  as a share of GDP  has doubled  over  the last few decades
and  is far above  the regional  average.  Competition  appears  to  be very strong  and  market
concentration  low.  Nevertheless,  there  are concerns  about  conflicts  of interest  for  sales
people  and  collusion between  annuitants  and  sales persons  to effectively cash in part  of the
annuity.  Both  practices  raise  observed  costs  and  reduce  annuity  streams.  On  balance,
however,  the market seems to function well.
The  incipient  markets  in  the  other  three  countries  are  less  competitive  and  more
concentrated,  especially in Colombia and Peru.  As expected,  the initial growth in the market
is generated  by new disability and survivors  insurance premiums.  Like Chile, the retirement
annuirv  market  is poised  for  dramatic  growth  in  the  coming  decade  in  Argentina  and  in
about  twenty  years in  Peru  and  Colombia  with  their younger  labor  forces..  On  the  other
hand,  the  potential  markets  in  the latter  two  countries are not  nearly as significant even in
the very long run because incomes  and coverage rates are lower than in Chile and Argentina.
The markets  in these  two countries  are large enough  to attract international  competitors  and
to allow for economies  of scale.
42There  are  explicit  government  guarantees  in  three  of  the  four  countries  although  the
exact  terms  varv  somexvhat.  While  there  have  been  no  calls  on  these  guarantees.  the  sy7stems
will not  have  been  tested  until  they  mature.  Little  attention  has  been  paid  to  assessing  the
impact  of  the  guarantees  on  market  behavior  or  to  valuing  the  contingent  liabilitv  that  thev
represent.  At  the  same  time,  supervision  of  the  benefit  phase  of  the  multipillar  schemes  is
less  strict  than  during  the  accumulation  stage.  Valuation  is  not  monitored  as  carefully  as is
true  for  the  AFPs  and  reporting  is less  frequent  and  less  detailed.  The  general  philosophv  of
proactive  supervision  which  characterizes  the  Superintendencies  of  the  pension  funds
contrasts  sharply  with  the  reactive  stance  of insurance  regulators.
Reserx-es  for  annuities  will constitute  a  large  pool  of  long  term  savings  to  be  invested
in the  capital  markets  bv insurance  companies.  In  Chile,  reserves  have  alreadv  reached  13.5
percent  of  GDP  and  will continue  to grow  rapidly.  The  pace  of  growth  will not  be  as  rapid
in  the  other  three  countries  partlv  because  of  the  transition  strategies  chosen.  The  use  of
recognition  bonds,  the  target  age of  the  switching  population,  and  the  contributior.  rate  for
the  second  pillar  are  among  the  main  transition  policies  affecting  the  short  and  medurum term
growth  of  the  system.  In  particular,  recognition  bonds  can  be  useful  for  jump  starting  the
annuity  industrv  in  the  initial  stage.
There  is  increasing  evidence  from  other  studies  that  institutional  invesrors  and
contractual  savings  help  develop  the  capital  markets  and  make  them  more  liquid.  The  long
term  nature  of  the  liabilitv  can lead  to the  extension  of the  vield  curve  and  increased  demand
for long  term  pnvate  instruments  like corporate  and  mortgage  bonds.  Converselv,  the  abilitv
of  the  annuitv  sellers  to  match  their  liabilities  with  long  term  assets,  and  in  some  cases
indexed  bonds,  depends  crucially  on  the  availabilitv  of  these  assets  in  a  secure  and  -well
regulated  environment.  Investment  limits  in  particular  must  also  strike  the  appropriate
balance  between  safety  and  the  need  to  generate  reasonable  rates  of  return.  The  restrictions
on  withdrawals  and  encouragement  of  annuities  extend  the  penod  during  which  contractual
savings  institutions  channel  long  term  resources  to the  capital  markets.
V.3  Mandatin,g annziizes
Economists  have  long  noted  the  welfare  gains  that  can  be  achieved  bv  pooling
longevity  risk.  At  the  same  time,  thev  observed  that  annuity  markets  in  the  LTS and
elsewhere  were  very  small.  The  fact  that  annuitants  lived  longer  than  the  general  population
suggested  that  the  markets  may  not  have  developed  because  of  adverse  selection.  Despite
the  recognition  that  other  factors  might  dampen  annuitv  demand,  a  senres  of  studies  in  the
1990s  focused  primarilv  on  the  measurement  of  the  adverse  selection  problem  in the  form  of
"money's  worth"  calculations.
It  is verv  possible  however,  that  the  other  factors  that  affect  the  demand  for  annuities
mav  result  in  what  looks  like  adverse  selection.  In  particular,  the  patterns  of  annuitized
public  pension  wealth  and  mortality  rates  for  different  wealth  strata  could  procduce  the
observed  discrepancy  between  annuitant  and  population  mortalitv  tables.  If  the  other
reasons  that  individuals  choose  to  hold  liquid  or  bequeathable  assets  dominate,  and  if  there
is no  strong  argument  for  market  failure,  then  it would  be  wise  for  policvmakers  to  consider
lower  levels  of  mandated  annuitization.  The  chosen  level  should  be  based  on  clear  policy
objectives  for  poverty  and  income  smoothing  and  should  take  into  account  factors  such  as
43the size of the first pillar.  Other  things  constant,  there  is less need  to mandate  annuities the
larger the first pillar.
If restrictions  are applied  to withdrawals  above  a minimum  target pension  level, (e.g.,
for the  purposes  of  consumption  smoothing),  there  should  be a variety of benefit  options
available,  reflecting  heterogeneous  preferences  and  risk  aversions  of  members.  Some
analvses have  shown  that  adding  variable  annuity,  limited  inflation  indexation  and  other
options  can raise  welfare  significantly  for  certain  individuals.  At  the  start  however,  the
complexities  of  supervising  multiple  products  and  the  inexperience  of  consumers  mav
recommend  a more restricted  set of options.  Worker  education  and good  information  can
help ensure that the annuity  market competes  on price  and  service and new products  can be
offered  later.  Finally, private  management  in  a  competitive  framework  is preferable  to  a
monopoly  annuitv  provider  for  some  of  the  same  reasons  that  policvmakers  chose  to
introduce  multipillar arrangements  in the first place.
1V4 Preliminagypolig  recommendations
The  recommendations  can  be  grouped  into  two  categories  - basic  public  policy
formulation  and regulation  of the markets.
Publicly-mandated  pension  schemes  force  individuals  to  save  during  their  working
years, so that they will not  experience a  sharp decline  in living standards  and  even poverty
during old age. The lifetime poor  are lifted from old age poverty by redistribution  within the
first pillar  of a multipillar  scheme  in  its vanrous forms  (e.g., minimum  pension  guarantee,
means-tested  or  demogrant,  and  contributors  defined  benefit  scheme  with  internal
redistribution).  For the rest  of the population,  the benefit  stage of the scheme  should  serve
to convert  the accumulation  of pension  rights into  a  stream  of retirement  income  that  will
maintain  target  relative or absolute  income  levels until  death.  This  public polihc  objective
can be  accomplished  by mandating  that  individual purchase  indexed  annuities  sufficient  to
meet  these  targets.  Over  and  above  this  level, policymakers  may  consider  allowing  for
withdrawals  or at  least more  flexible benefit  products  such  as variable  annuities  when  the
market conditions  and supervisory capacity are adequate.
However, benefit  design  for the  second  pillar should  take  into account  other  factors
that reduce  the need  for an annuity.  These factors  are also  those  that help  explain the  low
demand  for voluntary  private annuities  that  is observed  even in  countries where  long  term
contracts  are  enforceable.  They  include  the presence  of  informal  annuities  markets  and
precautionarv  savings for  health  and  other  contingencies.  Mandating  annuities  can reduce
welfare by forcing individuals to hold too  much of  their wealth in this  form.  On  the  other
hand, public policies that affect these factors - eg., extension  of health  insurance coverage  -
may change the underlying demand  for annuities and  the welfare gain from their provision.
Second  pillar benefit  design  should  take into  account  the  size of  the  first pillar.  A
large first pillar replacement  rate translates into  a high  proportion  of pre-annuitized  wealth,
especially for the  lower  half of the  income  distribution.  Other  things  constant,  countries
xwith  large first pillars should have lower levels of forced  annuitization  in the second pillar.
44Assuming  that  some  level  of  annuitization  will be  mandatorv,  policvmakers  must
address  the structure  of the market  for annuities.  The options include  contracting out by the
public  sector  based  on  competitive  tender,  direct  public  provision  and  decentralized,
regulated  private  provision.  The  last  option,  which  is  the  one  that  most  countries  have
chosen,  provides  the  discipline of competition  and avoids  the concentration  of a potentiallv
large pool of long term sav-ings  in the hands of a single entitv.
These advantages  may not appear however,  if the market  fails to reach  critical mass or
is poorlv  regulated.  Countries  introducing  a multipillar svstem should first assess during the
reform  design  stage  whether  or  not  thev  will  be  able  to  support  a  competitive  annuities
market  when  the  scheme  matures  given  coverage.  income  levels  and  transition  strategy.
Factors  that  will affect  the  size  of  the  market  but  are  not  subject  to  short  term  manipulation
by  policvmakers  include  the  extent  of  coverage  of  the  formal  pension  system  and  the
absolute  level  of  income  of  members.  Policies  that  can  help  countries  to  achieve  cntical
mass  include  the  use  of  recognition  bonds,  a  relatively  large  second  pillar  contribution  rate
and  a high  target  swvitching age.
In  those  countries  where  a  decentralized,  pnrvate  structure  seems  feasible,  the
government  may  consider  taking  the  following  steps  in order  to improve  the  outcome:
*  raise  standards  of  insurance  supervision  especially  as  relate  to  annuity  provision  and
generally  take a proactive  approach  to  supervision  in the  benefit  stage
*  produce  better  published  information  and  data
*  produce  the  best  possible  life tables  to  be  used  in calculating  annuities
*  minimize  potential  conflicts  of  interest  such  as  those  that  appear  to  exist  between
insurance  companies  and  salesmen
*  begin  with  relatively  simple  annuity  options  and  gradually  liberalize  options  over  time
*  encourage  financial  literacy  and  specificallv,  education  about  annuities
VS3  Conclusions  and areasforfuture  research
This  paper  has  focused  on  the  benefit  stage  of  the  new  mandatorn  defined
contribution  pension  schemes.  We  have  argued  that  there  are  public  policy  rationale  for
restricting  withdrawals  in  these  schemes  and  mandating  some  annuitization.  At  the  same
time,  it  is important  to  recognize  the  underlying  factors  driving  the  demand  for  annuities,
especially  other  sources  of  annuitized  wealth  or  substitutes.  In  particular,  the  amount  of
annuitization  in the  second  pillar  should  take  into  account  the  size  of  the  annuitv  in the  first.
Consideration  should  be  given  to  liberalizing  benefit  options  as markets  mature,  supervisory
capacity  increases  and  consumers  become  more  educated.
Despite  significant  differences  in  the  imtial  conditions  of  the  four  Latin  American
countries  considered  here,  benefit  choices  available  to  members  were  quite  similar.  In
particular,  indexed  annuities  were  generallv  offered  in  similar  forms  and  scheduled
45withdrawals  were  allowed.  The  latter  do  not  provide  longevity  insurance  but  do  allow
pensioners  to  earn investment  returns.  Argentina  was the onlv countrv  that  had  a kind of
variable annuitv product  although proposals  have been  advanced in Chile.
Two  decades  of experience  in  Chile  shows  that  the  matket  can be  competitive  and
provide  reasonablv pnrced annuities.  However,  we have  documented  some  problems  in the
system  including  conflict  of  interest  among  sales  persons,  a  lack  of  transparency  and
imperfect  consumer  knowledge.  These problems  are alread  y being  observed  in the younger
annuities markets  in the other  three  countries.  In addition,  there is some concern  the size of
the markets, especially in Peru and  Colombia  will not produce  the same kind of competition
and scale efficiency observed in Chile.
Supervisors  have  attempted  to  address  these  problems  to  a  certain  extent  but  the
regulatory  approach  is not  as  proactive  as  is the  case  for  the  accumulation  stage  of  the
system.  Reporting,  valuation  and  other  aspects  of the regulations  are less stringent  than  in
the  benefit  stage.  Guarantees  mav eventually  become  an issue  as schemes  mature  but  the
potential  costs to the government  do not appear to have been studied.
The  growth  of  the  annuities  market  in  Chile  has  been  dramatic,  contributing  to  a
boom in the life insurance industry over the last decade.  The same is beginning  to happen  in
the  other  three  countries  led by  survivors  and  disability products.  Projections  show  rapid
growth *vill  continue  in the next twenty  years.  However, the decision not to use recognition
bonds  in  Argentina  will slow  development  and  the  low  coverage  and  low  incomes  in
Colombia and Peru means that their markets  wiil be smaller in relative and absolute terms.
The restrictions  on  withdrawals  will be important  in determining  the composition  of
private  savings  by  keeping  most  of  the  accumulated  balances  of  the  mature  scheme  in
contractual  savings institutions.  Recent studies  suggest that holding  savings in this form may
have  a positive  impact  on  growth  by  extending  the  yield curve  and  providing  hquiditv  to
local capital markets.  The new institutional  investors  may also demand  better  capital market
infrastructure  and new products  and may  even help improve corporate  governance.
More research is needed in this area.  First, more information  on the  factors that affect
annuity  demand  is  needed  in  order  to  assess  the  gains  from  mandatorv  annuitization
properly.  This  is  especially  true  for  societies  with  strong  informal  systems  of  old  age
support.  Second,  the  competitiveness  and  efficiencv  of  emerging  annuities  markets  in
multipillar  countries  should  be  monitored.  This  includes  the  complex  question  of  how
insurance  companies  should  be allowed  to invest  and  what  the impact  of underdeveloped
asset  markets  might  be  for  matching  liabilities.  Third,  there  should  an  analysis  of  the
potential  cost  of  annuity  guarantees.  Fourth,  it  would  be  useful  to  study  the  private
providers  of annuities in Chile in order  to find out if there  are economies  of scale and, more
importantly,  determine  what is the critical mass that must  be reached  for a decentralized  and
privately-managed  system  to  be  viable.  Finally,  surveys  and  detailed  studies  of  workers'
knowledge of their pension system and in particular,  the annuities stage should be produced.
These  materials would be the basis for  mapping  out a strategy to improve  transparency  and
promote  worker education.
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50Annex  1 Evolution  of second  pillar benefits  in four Latin American  Countries
Table  1 Life  annuities  in Chile,  1988-1997
(December)
Toral  Partial
Year  Old-age  Earlv  old-age  disability  disabilin-  WVidows  Orphans  Others  Total
1988  3,433  766  867  0  233  338  5  5.642
1989  4,705  2.791  1,692  0  765  1.286  28  11,26-
1990  6,9'2  5.  1  2,645  0  1.807  3,050  84  2 0, 2'
1991  8,428  14.792  2,886  0  2,502  4,183  117  32,908
1992  9,99  23.461  2,953  0  3,037  4,99'  144  44,191
1993  11,529  33.12'  3,005  0  3,763  6,274  208  .;7,906
1994  13,261  43,750  2.709  532  4.621  7,583  263  72719
1995  14,162  53,382  2,'74  548  5,275  8,469  288  34,898
1996  16,736  63,831  3.302  608  6,766  10.499  388  102,130
1997  19,7 23  75 626  3,878  652  8.656  13,180  535  1 22,250
Source:  Superintendencia  de Administradoras  de Fondos  de  Pensiones:  Evolucion  del  Sistema  Chileno  de Pensioncs  No.3  (1981-1997).
Table  2  Scheduled  withdrawals  in Chile,  1988-1997
Total  Partal
Year  Otd-age  Farly old-age  dtsabditv  disabilit%  NXidows  Orphanis  Others,  Total
1988  8.385  5  2,426  0  2,956  4,171  191  18,134
1989  12,423  33  3,487  0  4,867  - 6,89  345  27,444
1990  16,852  41  4,095  0  6,640  8,536  532  36,696
1991  21,469  230  3,958  12  9,211  13,107  807  48,794
1992  25,590  934  4,162  31  11.121  14,173  987  56,998
1993  30,868  2,288  4,155  101  13,421  16,189  1.246  58,268
1994  37,465  5,573  4,670  240  16,636  18,992  1,617  35,193
1995  40,777  10,276  6,211  623  18,353  20,551  1,908  )8,699
1996  43,653  10,818  6,835  758  20,042  21,647  2188  105,941
1997  46.482  12,177  7,571  904  21,361  22-322  2434  113,251
Source:  Supenntendencia  de Administradoras  de Fondos de Pensiones:  Evolucion  del Sisterm  Chileno  de Persiones No.3 (1981-1997).
51Table  3  Benefits by cause in Argentina,  1995-1998
Date  Retirement  Disabilitv  Survivor  Total
9/30/95  12  82  1.153  1,247
12/31/95  41  143  2,349  2,533
6/30/96  110  366  4,373  4,849
12/31/96  338  766  6,840  7,944
6/30/97  774  1,198  8,958  10,930
12/31/97  1,980  2,370  12,809  17,159
6/30/98  4,606  3,832  18,966  27,404
12/31/98  7,299  5,363  25,151  37.813
Table  4  Benefits by type in Argentina, 1995-1998
Retirees  and Survivros
Date  Fract.  Scheduled  Annuit  Total
9/30/95  2  1,006  157  1,165
12/31/95  2  2,216  172  2.390
6/30/96  4  3,795  684  4,483
12/31/96  50  5,533  1.595  7,178
6/30/97  151  6,543  3,038  9,732
12/31/97  433  7,006  7,350  14,789
6/30/98  1,056  11,648  10,868  23,572
12/31/98  1,454  17,967  -13,029  32,450
Table  5  Benefits by type and  cause in Colombia, 1997-1999
Scheduled withdrawal  Annuity  Deferred  All
Old-age  Invalidity  Survivors  Old-age  Invalidity  Survivors  annuity  Old-age  Invalidity  Survivors  All
Jun-97  1  96  712  1  26  195  1  3  122  907  1032
Dec-97  48  169  880  2  30  355  3  53  199  1235  1487
Jun-98  64  225  1064  7  113  860  3  74  338  1924  2336
Sep-98  75  248  1075  9  153  1048  3  87  399  2123  2609
Dec-98  77  255  1020  14  196  1222  3  94  451  2242  2787
Jan-99  78  249  1047  14  196  1378  2  97  489  2425  3011
52Table  6  Retirement  benefits  by type and firm in Peru, 1995-1998
1995  1996  1997  1998
Horizonte  0  33  49  154
Annruir  9  4  11
Deferred  Annuin-  10  36  65
Scheduled  Withdrawal  14  9
Integra  0  72  135  297
Annuin-  13  18  15
Deferred  Annuitv  39  89  I-7
Scheduled  W"ithdrawal  20  2  105
Nueva  Vida  23  46  128
Annurt=  3  13
Deferred  Annuitv  16  31  80
Scheduled  Withdrawal  4  2  2'
in process  0  0  0  14
Profuturo  0  61  110  198
Annuity  24  15  34
Deferred  Annuity  20  62  86
Scheduled  Withdrawal  1i  33
Union  0  36  92  195
Annultv  6  10  18
Deferred  Annuiry  2  28  74
Scheduled  W'ithdrawal  28  54  .03
System  27  225  - 432  958
Annuirv  55  60  85
Deferred  Annuity  87  246  482
Scheduled  Withdrawal  83  126  391
in process  0  0  14
Table  7  Benefits  by cause,  1993-1998
Retirement  Disability  Surnivors  Total
1993  0  0  85  85
1994  0  12  891  903
1995  27  38  1108  1,173
1996  225  88  2211  2,524
1997  432  159  2747  3,338
1998  972  271  3252  4,495
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A grow,ing  number  of countries  have  introduced  mandatory  dletined  contribution
sChemes.  As these  schemes  mature,  their suiccess  will  increasingly  depend on
how'%,  well thev translate accumulated  fuinds  inito  a stream-  of retirement  income.
Successful  refo)rms  w,ill rely on a well regulated  andl  competitive insurance
sector.  Thev will  strike a balance between individual Preferences  andl  public
policy objectives  such as  providing a reasonable  amount of longevitv insurance.
This paper describes  the benefit stage in four Latin American countries and
presents  preliminary evidence on their emerging  annuities markets. We find
that these  markets  are less  transparent  than they shiould  be aind  that supervision
is less  strict than during the accumulation period.  Annuities miarkets  will growv
dlramatically in the comiing  dlecades  as  the reforms mature. Growth dlepends
on policy variables  such as  the u-se  of recognitioni bonds as  well as iniitial
conditions. The mTarkets  in Peru andl  Colombia will  be much smaller than
those  in Chile and Argentina  in hoth absolute  andi  relative  terms.  The  immaturitv
of the schemes  an-d  temporarily linmitecl  flow of' new pensioners  should be
vievwed  as  a windlow  of  opportuinitv  for improv\ingD  suipervision,  increasing
transparency  and(  educating \,vorkers.
HMN DEVELOPMENT  NETWORK
About this series...
The  World Bank Pension  Reform Primer  aims  to provide a timely and comprehensive  resource  for those
engaged in the design and implementation of pension reforms around the world.  Policymakers and
those who advise them will  find  useful information on other reform experiences, the current thinking
of pension specialists  and a vast  array of cross-country  evidence. A flexible and dynamic format ensure
that key developments  are updated as  they occur.
The  World  Bank  set out a conceptual framewvork  for fundamental pension reform in Averting the Old
Age Crisis: Policies  to Protect  the Old and Promote  Growth. This study,  published in 1  994, helped shape
the global debate  about the impact  of population ageing  on pension  systems.  The Pension  Reform  Primer
builds on this pioneering work and on the experience of the World Bank  and other international
institutions in the last five years.  It focuses  on practical questions.
For more information, please contact Social Protection, Human Development Network, World Bank,
1818 H Street  NW, Washington, D.C. 20433; telephone  +1  202 458 5267; fax ±1 202 614 0471; e-mail
socialprotectionr4worldbank.org All PensioDn  Reform Primer  material is available on the internet at
wvww.worldbank.org/pensions